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Abstract
Prejudice research shows that most psychologists focus on moderate prejudice in
superficial settings, rather than extreme prejudice in real-life situations. The present study
used an interpretive phenomenological analysis guided by social constructivism on 21
biographies to investigate how the authors voluntarily disaffiliated from their groups and
altered their prejudice. The narratives were retrieved from popular and academic book
and journal memoirs, digital and print interviews and articles, podcasts and video clips of
members of closed faith societies who were socialized to resent outsiders, with their
resentments turning into violence. The analysis used Willig’s 4 stages: immersion in
material, identifying core themes, summary of themes, and the amalgamation of the
summary into themes. Results of this study indicate that there seems to be a turning point
in which participants perceive the outside world in a different way. This change in
perception may occur in members of closed groups through conducting critical analyses,
reading source texts, and experiencing altruism from a member of the resented outside
groups. Recommendations include that communication between outsiders and group
members should reflect subtle, fact-based reasoning and manifest a customized approach
to reducing prejudice. The study offers an original approach for understanding socialized
violence. Governments and relevant entities could use this research to train invited
outsiders of a cult or closed faith society regarding how to decrease the prejudice of
closed group members.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The study of prejudice is one of the most voluminous fields in social science, but
as Paluck (2012) and Paluck and Green (2009) said, research should focus on deeply-held
prejudice, rather than on the weak or moderate prejudice that psychologists tend to
observe. Prejudice is instigated by an individual’s society or culture (Paluck 2012, 2016;
Sherif & Sherif, 1953), where prejudice towards different others is inculcated in its
members. This may explain why the prejudice-reducing interventions that are mostly
developed in liberal colleges on insulated college students do little to reverse prejudicial
attitudes (Giner-Sorolla, 2001). In fact, Paluck and Green (2009) recommended that
researchers evaluate real life situations for more accurate results and more effective
prejudice-reducing interventions.
Multidisciplinary studies, such as identity economics, sociology,
ethnopsychology, anthropology, and social psychology, show that individuals have an
innate need to belong to a group (Leary & Baumeister, 1995), to the point that people
who live in highly conformist settings are more likely to identify with their group norms,
even when these practices contradict normative standards that are endorsed by the
broader society (Paluck, 2012), harm one’s health and safety (Akerlof & Kranton, 2013;
Goldman, Giles, & Hogg, 2014; Hogg, Siegel, & Hohman, 2011), or contradict one’s
private beliefs (Prentice & Miller, 1996). One example of such groups is strongly
cohesive religious societies, also called closed faith societies that insulate themselves
from outsiders. In such groups, members are more vulnerable to indoctrination, since the
group imposes strict rules, has strong leaders, and sets clear boundaries (Weinstein,
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2006). Consequences for defiance are also punitive and severe. Subsequently, I found it
all the more incredible that certain individuals raised in these settings seemed to be able
to objectively detach themselves from the toxicity of their environments, assess their
socializations, and voluntarily reverse their enculturated hostilities to outsiders.
This study has been a product of more than 30 years of reading, reflection,
personal experience and interviews with former members of obedience-demanding, or
closed faith enclaves, prompted by my own experiences of leaving an isolated faith
community that applauded and practiced violence. I have also conducted wide and
intensive reading on multidisciplinary and related topics, more specifically on
epistemology, ethno psychology, religion, history, anthropology, sociology, and
advanced mathematics, along with my Master’s in philosophy and advanced logics. I
interviewed and worked with cults (e.g., Hari Krishna, the Moonies); interviewed, taught,
counseled, and worked with aspiring and actual terrorists (e.g., Zionist and Palestinian) in
the Middle East; interviewed, counseled, and taught Neo-Nazis as well as formercommunists (Hungary, Moldavia, Ukraine); and regularly experience Trumpism, white
supremacism and confederate loyalty in parts of North Virginia and environs. As an
aside, I studied with Yigal Amir, the man who assassinated Israel’s PM Yitzchak Rabin.
My experiences gave me a unique insider perspective to this study but also made me a
subjective researcher, which is why I labored all the harder to become aware of and
hedge my bias.
This is the first study in this genre that uses a qualitative approach based on an
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to investigate deeply-held prejudice in a
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real-life setting and to examine whether and how some individuals who grow up in
indoctrinated closed faith societies independently reverse their taught attitudes. Although
this study will be limited in its transferability for reasons that include its qualitative
methodology and its extremely small sample, I dare to hope that this dissertation may
contribute to the research literature on extreme prejudice. The rest of this chapter
discusses the research problem and the conceptual framework for the study before
defining certain terms, detailing limitations of this study, and suggesting implications for
positive social change.
Background
In 2009, Paluck and Green (2009) conducted the most extensive literature
research to date on prejudice-reducing interventions, to find which prejudice
interventions worked and to assess the internal and external reliability of the different
prejudice studies and their methods. Paluck and Green (2009) defined prejudice as
negative bias, racism, homophobia, ageism, antipathy toward ethnic, religious, national,
or other groups, prejudice toward persons who are overweight, poor, or disabled, and
attitudes toward diversity, reconciliation, and multiculturalism. At the same time, Paluck
and Green (2009) excluded gender-based prejudice (i.e., beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors
toward gender), although they focused on gender-identity prejudices such as
homophobia. In total, the researchers accumulated 985 reports, which they divided into
three categories: nonexperimental field studies (66%), laboratory-based experimental
studies (29%), and triangulated methods/field experimental studies (11%).

4
The nonexperimental prejudice intervention studies consisted of noncontrol
groups and evaluation studies that mostly investigated sensitivity and culturalcompetence programming, mass media campaigns, and diversity training. Out of 207 of
these studies, Paluck and Green (2009) challenged the internal reliability of 195. When it
came to laboratory or purely experimental studies, Paluck and Green (2009) found these
studies creative and precise but faulted them for studying prejudice that is a real-life
attitude in a superficial environment. Examples of such studies included intergroup
approaches, social identity and categorization theories, as well as psychological affect
and cognitions. Their methods ranged from instruction, expert opinion and norm
information, manipulating accountability, consciousness-raising, and targeting personal
identity, self-worth, or emotion. On mixed methods prejudice reduction studies, Paluck
and Green (2009) concluded that most of these studies lacked rigorous evaluation and
needed more intensive and extensive research. The focus of these studies included
cooperative learning, social media-based technology, discussions, peer influence,
cognitive training, self-worth interventions, and social categorization.
Additionally, Paluck and Green (2009) recommended research on the
psychological implications of obedience and conformity. The researchers (2009) noted
that:
Psychologists are a long way from demonstrating the most effective ways to
reduce prejudice. Due to weaknesses in the internal and external validity of
existing research, the literature does not reveal whether, when, and why
interventions reduce prejudice in the world. (p. 360)
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Paluck and Green (2009) advised researchers to include identity-focused perspectives like
social identity and categorization, identity and value-motivated techniques, and social
cognitive (stereotype and implicit prejudice) interventions, as well as to focus on areas
like multiculturalism and moral education. The reviewers added that although laboratory
experiments test certain theses with precision, all prejudice-oriented experiments should
be replicated outside the laboratory on “the many millions of ordinary citizens living in
conflict or postconflict settings” (p. 359) and that scientists should focus on “obedience
and conformity, the very forces that have been implicated in some of the most notorious
expressions of prejudice in world history” (p. 360). Paluck and Green (2009) concluded
that “researchers should strive to reduce deeply held prejudices rather than the more
transitory prejudices associated with ‘minimal’ groups” (p. 361).
In her 2012 review, Paluck (2012) observed that too many prejudice-reducing
interventions failed to show statistical effect, because they investigated attitude in the
classroom instead of in a real life setting. Paluck (2012) suggested that social scientists
use Lewin’s interactionist perspective, where attitude is studied as the integration of
person and situation and where situation represents the social, cultural, and political
forces in the person’s immediate environment. In the same way, Murrar, Gavac, and
Brauer (2016) called for more real-world investigations on a diversified and more
representative population outside the university walls.
The following study followed Paluck and Green’s (2009) suggestions and
investigated real life prejudice in the context of an obedience and conflict setting. It also
focused on prejudice in its most extreme form, as indoctrinated attitude, and considered
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sociological constructs like contact, social identity and categorization, social cognition
and moral education. The forms of prejudice investigated in this study were racism,
homophobia, antipathy toward ethnic, religious, national, and other groups, and distrust
regarding diversity, reconciliation, and multiculturalism in general.
Problem Statement
Most prejudice-reducing interventions are conducted on American, largely liberal,
college students who are sheltered from the types of environments that produce extreme
prejudice (Pollack & Green, 2009). Meanwhile, extreme prejudice from tribalism,
populism, and nativism expanded over the last two years (Slate, 2018). Examples include
white supremacism, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and homophobia. Of the
complete range of prejudice-reducing interventions that Paluck and Green (2009)
investigated, all of their studies dealt with weak to moderate prejudice and all were tested
in sheltered conflict-free environments.
As Paluck (2016) reflected:
What do social scientists know about reducing prejudice in the world? In short,
very little. Of the hundreds of studies on prejudice reduction conducted in recent
decades, only 11% test the causal effect of interventions conducted in the real
world. (p. 147)
Paluck (2009) called for more rigorous studies that integrate theory and
methodology and insisted that researchers investigate subjects in conflict-filled
environments. Both researchers urged psychologists to probe deeply-held prejudice rather
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than the more transitory prejudices associated with peripheral situations and conflict-free
groups. This is what this study sets out to do.
Purpose of the Study
The study analyzed autobiographical data from defectors of closed faith societies
to identify core themes associated with the retraction of their socialized prejudices.
The narratives were retrieved from popular and academic book and journal memoirs,
digital and print interviews and articles, podcasts, and video clips. Themes were analyzed
to understand the lived experiences of each participant and their motivations for
renouncing their bias. This study’s goal is to help peace activists and state-sponsored
programs generate and test appropriate interventions to prevent and defuse bigotry in
insulated societies.
Research Questions
I used autobiographical material to qualitatively examine the lived experiences of
21 defectors from closed faith groups. This study was guided by the following research
questions:
RQ1: What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they disengage
and deradicalize?
RQ2: What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith
groups?
Conceptual Approach
I used the theory of social constructivism. Social constructivism says knowledge
is constructed through one’s particular environment and that one’s perceptions derive
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from the culture or environment one inhabited (Young & Colin, 2004). It repudiates the
idea that observations accurately reflect the observed world (Murphy et al., 1998). The
phrase was coined by Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality
(1961), which maintained that people’s knowledge and conceptions of reality come from
their societies, making one’s experience of reality socially constructed. I approached my
research with the admission that my judgments were shaped by my history, identity,
culture, and experiences, and that my textual interpretations were, subsequently,
subjective.
Nature of the Study
This study used the interpretive phenomenological approach (IPA), where
autobiographical texts in the form of books, print and digital articles, video clips, and
podcasts were analyzed to search for common patterns and themes (Smith, Larkin, &
Flowers, 2009). I chose IPA, since this approach seeks to discover how individuals
construct meaning of their experiences (Moerer-Urdahl & Creswell, 2004); I sought to
discover how certain individuals reversed their indoctrinated prejudices. My
methodology choice was supported by studies (e.g., Todorova and Kotzeva (2006) on
religious deconversion and Smith and Osborn (2007) on identity conflict) showing that
IPA is widely used in mental health and therapy research on toxic attitudes. The
interpretive phenomenological stance helped me navigate themes that emerged through
analysis of the data. I used IPA to make sense of the contextual and evaluative
experiences of the subjects. At the same time, I tried to maintain a social constructivist
stance through all stages of the subject’s journey, from when the subject delegitimized
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the outsider to when the subjects exited their groups and no longer saw the outsider as
“other”.
My subjects came from a range of closed faith societies that included Jehovah
Witness, Old World Amish (Old Order), extreme Muslim groups (like Wahhabi or Salafi
ideology), Haredi or Hassidic Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mormon fundamentalism (FLDS
Church), Christian fundamentalism (like Kingdom Identity Ministries, Pentecostalism, or
some Baptist and Evangelical fundamentalist groups), and the Official Church of
Scientology. A common denominator in their education was their ties to their
communities and the spectrum of methods used to raise strong barriers against the outside
world. According to Hammersborg (2005), insular faith communities establish an
understanding of “they” and “we”, where not even close relatives are part of the “we” if
they exist outside the community. Such communities generate fear of everything outside.
Children know that breaking out will result in severance from family and friends.
Defectors run the risk of being despised, excommunicated, and losing their footholds in
their communities (Hammersborg, 2005).
Some of these communities restrict contact with the outside, to the extent that
they ban outlets that include TV, radio, libraries, secular reading material, movies, and
internet. Former participants described it as "You are even not allowed to have free
thoughts” (Hammersborg, 2005, p.5). The result is a climate of growing up without
exposure to the “outside” world or the possibility for normal opinion forming, which
makes it all the more striking that exceptional individuals break out to challenge their
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indoctrinations. These are the subjects whose narratives I investigated in Chapter Three
of this dissertation.
Operational Definitions
Amazing Apostates: Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) gave this term to
individuals who come from highly religious backgrounds with intense pressure to
conform but disengaged from or exited their group. The researchers considered them
amazing because these individuals seem to contradict socialization predictions.
Closed faith society: A group or cult that insulates itself from other societies and
cultures to protect its faith and opinions (Hammersborg, 2005).
Deeply-held, or extreme prejudice: Extreme feelings of hostility manifested as
one or more of the following: Homophobia, racism, antipathy toward ethnic, religious,
national, and other groups, distrust to diversity, reconciliation, and multiculturalism, and
may veer to violence or aggression against outsiders (Paluck & Green, 2009).
Deradicalization: The process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting
the group’s intolerant ideology, and embracing mainstream values (Rabasa et al., 2010).
Prejudicial Cognition: The social scientific perspective that proposes that
evolutionarily and culturally derived mental abstractions subconsciously cause humans to
categorize or stereotype. Many contemporary social scientists tend to equate prejudice
with stereotyping and subsequently develop prejudice-reducing interventions using
cognitive-based strategies (Forscher & Devine, 2015).
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Socialization: Socialization refers to a continuing process where an individual
integrates the norms, values, behavior, and social skills from his or her culture as part of
their identity (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986).
Assumptions
My study’s faulty assumptions include the following. First, I assumed that I can
extract certain insights from my limited population, although it is highly likely that a
larger autobiographical pool may produce different or contradictory indicators. Second,
autobiography lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which makes my study questionable
from the start. Third, I focused on socialized prejudice ignoring the type of prejudice that
comes from traumatized experiences, such as terrorism (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001). This
limits research implications to the typified context of my subjects.
Scope and Delimitations
I used a purposive sample of texts collected from academic institutions,
universities and colleges, and libraries from six countries and four US states. I also
consulted blog posts, audio and visual material from print and digital sources. These
included YouTube, forums, chats, and Reddit posts from people who dropped out of
Judaism, Catholicism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism, and sectarian groups like
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hinduism, and Protestantism. Search terms included dropout,
extreme religion, apostasy, extremism, fundamentalism, deradicalization, and
radicalization.
I chose to focus on faith-filled insular societies because I reasoned that the
indoctrinations and experiences of members of such groups make their prejudice reversal
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even more unnatural, and that their reversal comes from their own choice. I limited my
research to authors who received minimal or no contact with the outside world, who were
incessantly taught hostility to outsiders, and who independently reversed their attitudes. I
also focused on psychological “push” features rather than “pull” features. “Pull” features
refer to qualities outside the group that the individual finds attractive, while “push”
features refer to adverse characteristics associated with the group that force people to
reconsider their involvement with the group (McAdam, 1986). Even though both features
are integrated, I focused on push aspects to see which elements of the experiences may
have caused the subjects to disengage themselves from their group’s bigotry teachings,
despite lacking contact with an outside world.
Limitations
The interpretative phenomenological approach comes with limitations which
include researcher bias. In my case, additional limitations included that my
interpretations could not be corroborated by my subjects, and that further research would
likely find accounts that may provide different, or contradictory, perspectives. Yin (1994)
pointed out that researchers who analyze documents or content tend to possess a biased
selectivity, where the researcher may consciously or otherwise only select documents that
support their views. This may have been the case with me. I acknowledged the risk of my
experiences effecting my interpretations and chose the social constructivist stance to
hedge my bias. I also engaged the services of an objective individual (a qualified student
with no prior knowledge of my research or reading) to replicate the IPA reading and
coding process.
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Significance of the Study
This study is significant in three ways. First, it used a qualitative approach, in line
with Paluck and Green’s (2009) recommendation, to investigate prejudice in its real-life
setting. Second, it investigated real-life prejudice from the standpoint of authentic
experience, deviating from the typical prejudice-based studies that are conducted on
largely liberal university students from privileged or upper middle-class backgrounds
(e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009; Stangor, 2009). Third, this study examined a deep prejudice
that causes violence and terrorism on a micro to macro scale. Significant segments of the
world are indoctrinated in deep prejudice. I used IPA for insights on how to prevent and
inhibit extreme prejudice in multicultural and cross-generational contexts.
Summary
Prejudice studies is one of the most voluminous fields in social science, but more
research should focus on extreme prejudice and investigate prejudice reduction in a reallife setting. This study used a qualitative phenomenological approach based on
autobiographical texts of individuals who grew up in settings that inculcated extreme
hostility to outsiders. The study probed for themes that may have caused these subjects to
voluntarily retract their attitudes. Results of this study may help scientists and activists
improve their understanding of the psychology of prejudice reversal. Chapter Two
summarizes and discusses limitations and gaps in the research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This study analyzed autobiographical reports, memoirs, and interviews from
multiple individuals who were raised in prejudice-indoctrinating closed faith societies,
and who voluntarily reversed their prejudices. The study aimed to understand the lived
experiences of these individuals as they reversed their attitudes to outsiders. In this way,
this study sought to fill gaps in prejudice-literature, by focusing on prejudice in in its reallife context and in its most extreme form (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009; Paluck, 2012;
Murrar, Gavac, and Brauer, 2016).
Paluck and Green (2009) and Paluck (2012) noted that social scientists tend to
neglect prejudice drivers like conflict, obedience, and conformity and that most prejudice
studies separate attitude from environment (i.e., they study bias in a superficial insulated
setting). This study attempted to correct for these gaps by noting that since individuals
are inseparable from their environments, their attitudes need to be studied in their
environmental contexts (e.g., Paluck, 2012). My study, therefore, used an interpretative
phenomenological analysis (IPA) to uncover emergent themes from the lived experience
of defectors from closed faith societies who were socialized to demonize and harm
outsiders.
Literature Search Strategy
Sources used for my literature research came from peer-reviewed content on
prejudice as well as from multi-disciplinary texts and were retrieved from libraries,
colleges and universities in Israel, United States, Britain, Switzerland, Prague, Moldova,
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and Hungary. Peer-reviewed journal sources came from Walden University’s
EBSCOHost system, ScienceDirect, SAGE Journals Online, PubMed and
PubMedCentral, Academic OneFile (Galegroup), and Omnifile full-text. Key search
words used for the literature review included the following: Loss of faith, prejudice, and
extreme prejudice, review of prejudice, intolerance, conflict, bias, homophobia, intergroup conflict, and stereotype.
Conceptual Framework
I used the theory of social constructivism to guide me. The theory acknowledges
that human perceptions emerge from environmental influences (Young & Colin, 2004)
and reinforces Bacon’s (1897) thesis that one’s observations inaccurately reflect the
observed world (Murphy et al., 1998).
Social constructionism is related to the postmodernist interpretivist approach on
how cognitive meanings are created, developed and sustained, and, like interpretivism,
tries to generate an objective science to investigate subjective experience (Schwandt,
2003). In their social construction of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann (1961) proposed
that knowledge is societally derived by each society deciding what it wishes to focus on
and by each society inheriting and developing its own terminology to discuss fields of
knowledge. This affects one’s epistemological perceptions on all elements of the world
and human conduct. The main problem with social constructionism is that it challenges
even seemingly self-evident and stable realities (e.g., Schwandt, 2003) and, consequently,
opens the way to subjective and, often contradictory, multiple realities, making it
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impossible to formulate any serious conclusions. I, therefore, only used social
constructivism as a tool to make me aware of and monitor my bias.
Literature Review Related to Key Theories and Concepts
Duckitt (1992) divided prejudice-based research into seven distinct periods and
showed how each era influenced prejudice research through its particular social-political
construction. Prejudice research began in the 19th century with its race and class theory,
where scientists suggested that certain nationalities and ethnicities dominated others.
Historian John S. Haller (as cited in Sarich & Miele, 2005) wrote “almost the whole of
scientific thought in America and Europe… accepted race inferiority” (cited by Sarich &
Miele, 2005, (p. 78). Race theories encouraged Whites to subjugate Blacks under the
understanding that Blacks were intellectually backwards, over-sexed, and primitive.
Psychologists developed tests that seemed to confirm this thesis.
In the 1930s to the 1940s, scientists turned their attention to the mechanisms of
intra-group bias. That paradigm shift emerged from socio-political upheavals that
included race and gender protest movements in Europe and the United States and the
cumulative effect of two World Wars. The last War, in particular, stirred discussion on
the irrationality of ethnic stereotyping and prejudice. Several of the commentators,
including Asch, Milgram, and Festinger, were victims of German discrimination. Winer,
one of Milgram's obedience study subjects, noted that "Milgram was very Jewish. I was
Jewish. We talked about this. There was obviously a motive behind neutral research"
(Alchetron, online). The post-War era was one where scientists redefined prejudice as a
faulty and irrational attitude and sought to understand its causes.
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In the 1950s, psychologists used psychoanalysis as an explanatory tool for
prejudice (Duckitt, 1992) and suggested that bias came from repression and served to
relieve inner conflicts and frustrations. Nazis, for instance, allegedly vented their political
humiliation on weaker people like Jews, gypsies, or homosexuals. American scientists
used methodologies like case studies and longitudinal or correlational research to trace
inter-race relations to their Freudian core. Although psychodynamics is rarely used to
explain prejudice today, some studies (e.g., Jackson, 2011) still use this model to
understand stereotype and conflict.
The fifth paradigm of prejudice emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, when
research transitioned from individual-level psychological factors to cultural and social
influences (Duckitt, 1992). The context was race riots in South Africa with governmentbacked racism and segregation in America’s South (Blackwell, 1982). Whole legions of
seemingly good and genteel people discriminated against humans of different colors and
race. Psychologists proposed two psychological mechanisms, socialization (Lewin, 1952;
Pettigrew & Back, 1967; Rokeach, 1960) and conformity (Adorno et al., 1950; Lewin,
1952; Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Back, 1967) and promised that harmony would be
achieved when Whites accepted Blacks in all areas of their lives. The urban revolts of the
late 1960s and the hardening of resistance demolished such optimism and showed that
prejudice extended throughout the United States not just in the South. Sociologists turned
to historical and sociological factors for drivers that included colonialism (Blauner,
1972), a split labor market (Bonacich, 1972), institutionalized racism (Carmichael &
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Hamilton, 1967), and the socioeconomic advantages for Whites in maintaining a stable
Black underclass (e.g., Crandall & Schaller, 2004).
Social scientists of the 1970s termed prejudice a more subtle, complex, and
insidious type of racial bigotry (Frey & Gaertner, 1986), where antipathy appealed to
convention for approval (Brewer et al., 2003; Fiske 2002). (Whites, for instance, would
accuse minority groups of exploiting racial preferences (Schneider, 2005)). The 1970s
also saw the minimal intergroup paradigm, which stated that people subconsciously
categorized individuals into an “us” versus “them” schematology. As the 1970s drew into
the Computer Age, social scientists discussed cognitive processes (e.g., Bar Tal et al,
1989) and equivocated stereotype with prejudice. Prejudice was reduced to automatic
cognitive elements. Hamilton (1981), for instance, reduced prejudice to stereotypes and
called the attitude implicit and subconscious (see Dovidio et al., 2010; Fiske, 1998;
Stangor, 2000; Whitley, Kite, & Adams, 2012 for further discussion, history, and
literature review). Scientists developed priming procedures to elicit non-conscious
processing, with Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz’s (1998) Implicit Association Test
(IAT) becoming one of the most popular of such instruments. Famous contributors to this
“unconscious bias approach” included Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Kahneman,
Slovic, and Tversky (1982), who demonstrated that rationality was reducible to mental
heuristics. This cognitive approach is the theoretical basis that underlies most
contemporary prejudice-associated interventions (e.g., Brown, 2010; Duckitt, 2002; Fiske
& Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Some social scientists
lamented that the “psychological approaches to intergroup relations [have] become more

19
and more focused upon the cognitive underpinnings of intergroup attitudes and less and
less focused upon the affective determinants of prejudice” (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford,
1991, p. 360), or of sociological determinants, for that matter. As of 2018, the dominant
approach to prejudice-reduction remains the cognitive model.
The Role of Cognition in Intra-Group Conflict, Bias, and Prejudice
Most researchers use the cognitive approach for prejudice, equivocating prejudice
with stereotype formation, activation and function (e.g., Brewer et al., 2003; Duckitt,
1992; Stangor, 2009). Their works tend to follow Kahneman and Tversky’s (2000)
pioneering research, where the authors showed that people tend to perceive and judge
others automatically. Kahneman and Tversky called these cognitive biases “judgment” or
“evaluation” heuristics. Other researchers labeled these heuristics “social categorization”
(e.g., Turner & Oakes, 1986), where perceivers automatically classify individuals on
appearance, mannerisms, or other types of categories (Brewer et al., 2003; Fiske, 2002).
Historians tend to trace this idea of social categorization to Allport, with
twentieth-century and contemporary researchers (e.g., Brown, 1995) tracing these
heuristics to early socialization from parents, teachers, or the person’s formative
environment. Some researchers (e.g., Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001) suggest that these
heuristics may be reversed through personal experience and social conditions. Scientists,
such as Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998), Nosek and Banaji (2001), and
Steinman and Karpinski (2009) developed a wide range of measurement techniques and
research paradigms to uncover allegedly implicit bias. These tests work by a process
called “priming” that exposes participants to a word or image supposed to trigger hidden
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stereotypes (e.g., Ask, Granhag, Juhlin, & Vrij, 2012; Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Steinman &
Karpinski, 2009). The IAT (Greenwald et al., 2002), for instance, measures how rapidly
people categorize certain words and images. Faster mental responses to "whites or
intelligence" and "blacks or violence" could indicate subversive bias.
One of the most potent criticisms of this approach came from Dixon and
colleagues (2014) who pointed out that while researchers banter over the relative
inconsequentialities of implicit prejudice, they ignore the very real prejudice that harms.
It is this type of prejudice, they say, that needs to be researched and treated.
The Role of Affect in Intra-Group Conflict
Critics of the cognitive-based framework (e.g., Dijker, 1987; Edwards & von
Hippel, 1995; Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993; Pettigrew, 1997; Stangor, Sullivan &
Ford, 1991; Zanna, Haddock & Esses, 1990) insist that since prejudice is an attitude, it is
affect-based rather than cognitive in origin. To quote Hamilton (1981):
If there is any domain of human interaction that history tells us it is laden with
strong, even passionate, feelings, it is in the area of intergroup relations. And this
point makes clear the fact that the cognitive approach, despite the rich and varied
approaches it has made in recent years, is by itself incomplete. (p. 347)
If prejudice is affect, this may explain why prejudice-reducing programs that are
formulated on cognitive assumptions tend to demonstrate mixed results. When such
programs are tested on stereotype cognitions, the program seems to succeed, but when
analyzing emotions, those same interventions fail or show insignificant results.
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Neuroscience supports the idea that affect drives prejudice, with some fMRI
studies (e.g., Amodio et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2005) linking prejudice with heightened
amygdala activity that is the neural region associated with emotion. Schwartz and Clore
(1994) showed that people evaluate in terms of an “I feel” rather than an “I think”
perspective, while Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) reported that feelings rather than
perceptions prime social judgment. Forgas (1995) demonstrated that various conditions
of affect, including valence, arousal properties, and motivation, conspire to influence
social judgments and behaviors. Fein and Spencer (1997) stated that poor confidence - an
emotion - triggers prejudice, while Smith (in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993) defined
prejudice as “a social emotion experienced with respect to one’s social identity as a group
member, with an outgroup as a target” (p. 304). Taylor (2007) conducted a textual
analysis which showed that it is only the lowest levels of stereotype that exclude emotion.
Prejudice, she said, ranges from highly emotive to muted, and less prejudiced individuals
tend to use more cognitive descriptors than individuals on higher ends of the spectrum.
High-level racist texts, like Hitler’s Mein Kampf, employed emotional terms more
intensely and more frequently than less dispassionate, academic texts (Taylor, 2007).
How is prejudice produced, or what are its underlying mechanisms? Certain
scientists (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006; Lazarus, 1984; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993;
Smith & DeCoster, 2000) suggested that affect and cognition combine to generate
attitudes that include prejudice, while other scientists (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990;
Pryor, Reeder, & Landau, 1999; Weiner, 1986; Zajonc, 1980, 2001) claimed that
cognition and emotion inhabit separate interacting channels. Pryor and colleagues (1999)
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distinguished between the attitude of prejudice that is affect-based and the perception of
stereotype that originates from a rule-based, more rational cognitive process, slower to
develop and easier to control. Similarly, Bodenhausen and Moreno (2001) affirmed that
although stereotypes may shape intergroup perception and behavior, it is the feeling
states that arises in the presence of members of stereotyped groups that shadows
intergroup interactions. This may explain why the more passionate type of prejudice that
comes from conflict-ridden situations typically resists remediation (Bar-Tal & Labin,
2001).
Social Psychology and Prejudice
The social psychology perspective of prejudice suggests that people are
acculturated by their groups and that they transmit their group’s norms, opinions and
beliefs. The social identity model, for instance, emphasizes that individuals divide
themselves into in-group/outgroup categories and that group membership determines
partisanship to individuals (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Both Allport (1954; 1979) and
Tajfel (1981) noted that people are acculturated to categorize individuals into groups,
with Tajfel adding that people categorize to win their group’s approval. Wetherell’s
(1987) self-categorization theory (SCT) posited that a person shifts between personal
identity and social identity, depending on which aspect is most salient at the time. A
person’s level of social identity exists on a continuum, with most people showing an
average desire to belong to their groups, while some individuals manifest extreme group
identity (Dovidio et al, 2003). It is these individuals who are more likely to demonstrate
hostility to outsiders (Guimond, 2000).
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Social identity theory reminds me of identity economics which states that people
integrate social norms to gain pleasure from group-acceptance and to avoid the penalties
and pain of rejection (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2013). Individuals not only develop
collective or group selves (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, &
McGarty, 1994), but some theorists say that individuals become, or are, groups, namely
that they acquire an identity that is inseparable from their groups (Ellemers, 2012;
Swann, 2009). This is particularly so with individuals who are socialized in a society of
conformism, where indoctrination and societal intimidation emphasize group norms.
Paluck (2012) pointed out that people in highly conformist settings are more likely to
identify with group norms, even when these norms contradict normative standards that
are endorsed by the broader society, harm one’s health and safety (Akerlof & Kranton,
2013; Goldman, Giles, & Hogg, 2014, Hogg, Siegel, & Hohman, 2011), or contradict
one’s private beliefs (Prentice & Miller, 1996). This is particularly so when the group
imposes strict rules, has strong leaders, and sets clear boundaries (e.g., Weinstein, 2007).
In short, social psychology suggests that prejudice follows a social trajectory as much as
it may a cognitive or evaluative one. Whitehead and Stokoe (2015) argued that since
people cannot be separated from groups, prejudice should be studied in a real-life setting
and evaluated as the social condition that it is.
Studies on Extreme Prejudice
I found few studies that discussed extreme and explicit prejudice, although there
were two interesting literature reviews (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Berger, 2016) that
reviewed deradicalization and disengagement from violent extremism. These reviews
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suggested that extremism cannot be remedied with popular interventions like interfaith
groups, exercises in logic, or debate, but that members could be influenced to question
their options by being exposed to contradictory and questionable elements of their
cultures.
Littman and Paluck (2014) suggested that extreme prejudice and hostility
originate from violence-prone groups, by these groups desensitizing their citizens and
normalizing bigotry and extremism. This explains why even ethically-minded individuals
who grow up in such environments tend to exhibit intolerance. Dixon and colleagues
(2014), also, negated the effect of prejudice research done by social scientists, claiming
that these studies tended to be formulated on “lovey-dovey” ideas of peace and
understanding and that they were mostly executed on college campuses, in regions with
minimal conflict. Stephan (1986) reported that the prejudice intervention method of
encounter groups not only achieved insignificant results but also harmed under certain
conditions. Only 17% of studies of encounter groups in conflict-driven environments
indicated a decline in prejudice, while 46% of these studies reported an increase
(Stephan, 1986). Dixon and colleagues (2014) proposed that prejudice reduction in
conflict regions starts with stabilizing the afflicted nation or region. Dalgaard-Nielsen
(2013) and Berger (2016) also concluded that interventions like contact-groups or debates
fail to reverse extremist attitudes. In short, research indicated that most prejudiceintervention methods are questionable, with certain methods succeeding in certain
situations but failing in others. The interventions that succeeded seemed to do so mostly
in the “lovey dovey” context, but were defeated in conflict settings, like North Africa, the
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Middle East or inner-city ghettos. Dixon and colleagues (2014) concluded, “We hold that
the entire ‘problematic’ of prejudice and prejudice reduction is ripe for a careful
reappraisal in our discipline” (p.22).
What Is Unknown about These Issues
The cognitive approach remains the dominant psychological approach to
understanding and explaining discrimination, prejudice, discrimination, stereotypes, and
conflict (e.g., Duckitt, 1992), but critics point to serious flaws. Two largely overlooked
limitations are that the cognitive approach fails to explain individual differences in
intergroup attitude and behavior (Condor & Brown, 1988) and that it fails to explain how
individuals are socialized into the norms and attitudes of their group. As discussed
earlier, the cognitive approach also focuses on a weak sort of bias, while it ignores the
very real problems of everyday violence and hatred (e.g., Dixon et al, 2014). Third,
prejudice is an affect-based attitude derived from real-life conditions, but the cognitive
approach tests its assumptions under laboratory conditions (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009).
In their comprehensive review, Paluck and Green (2009) and Paluck (2012) rated
most prejudice-reducing methods (these included diversity training, multicultural, antibias and moral education, sensitivity training, and certain types of conflict resolution
strategies) inconclusive. Prejudice-reducing methods somewhat more reliable were
cooperative learning and social interdependence theory (e.g., Roseth, Johnson & Johnson,
2008), media and entertainment interventions (built on social norms and social cognitive
theories; e.g., Cameron et al., 2005), peer influence and discussion or dialogue programs
based on social impact theory (Paluck, 2010), intergroup contact (e.g., Green & Wong,
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2009), self-worth interventions connected to cognitive-dissonance and self-perception
theory (e.g., Rokeach, 1971), and cross-cultural and intercultural training (Bhawak &
Brislin, 2000). Paluck, (2012) and Paluck & Green (2009) reported these programs, too,
showed contradictory results and needed to be supported with behavioral and longitudinal
observations.
The encounter method of diversity training, for instance, has long been promoted
for reducing prejudice despite its propensity for attracting polemical attacks and lawsuits
(Feder, 1994). Feder (1994) insisted that many encounter groups use methods that no
reliable psychologist would recommend. Allport (1954) was one of many scientists who
noted that diversity training works best under conditions where “contact is sanctioned by
institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere)” (p. 202) which makes it
impotent for socialization of closed societies like cults. The encounter group can also fail
to positively affect individuals traumatized by the stigmatized group (Bodenhausen,
2009; Zarate, Sanders, & Garza, 2000). Successful group dynamics require that
individuals of both sides be open to modifying their preconceptions. If this does not
occur, participants may refrain from stereotyping atypical exemplars (Fiske, 2002), but
persist in stereotyping the group. In short, the encounter group works best on challenging
superficial impressions in conflict-free regions but fails to reverse experience or groupderived prejudice, since affect is stronger than cognition and far more resilient to control
(LeDoux, 1996).
Research on other prejudice interventions, such as stereotype-suppression and
promotion of counter-stereotypes, shows that stereotype-suppression not only fails to
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suppress prejudice but has a reverse effect (Galinsky & Moscowitz, 2000; Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). When researchers attempted to change actual belief (as, for
instance, in Wegner and Petty’s [1997] Flexible Correction Model) participants tended to
either ignore (Trope & Thompson, 1997), distort (Darley & Gross, 1983), forget
(Stangor, 2009), or rationalize (Swim & Sanna, 1996) contradictory information. Some
untested studies suggested that individuals may question their prejudice when faced with
inconsistencies in their values, attitudes, and behaviors. Hing, Li and Zanna (2002), for
instance, used dissonance-related techniques to reduce anti-gay, anti-Asian, and antiBlack prejudice. But their studies were one of many that lacked conclusive evidence
(Paluck & Green, 2009).
Finally, I found few studies that focused on extreme prejudice. Messick and
Mackie (1989) reported that standard prejudice-reducing interventions focus on
superficial in-group favoritism rather than on outgroup hostility. Marilyn Brewer (1999)
said that prejudice models focus on positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and
trust that are reserved for the in-group, rather than on negative emotions, like hate and
aggression, that exist in radical conditions. As Dutton and colleagues (2005) concluded
after searching in vain for some psychological explanation for the unending inter and
intra-group conflict in Africa: “The explanation of the specific forms of violence, rape,
mutilation, torture, etc., is not forthcoming from current psychological knowledge [...]
psychology has not attempted to account for the extremity of massacre” (Dutton,
Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005, p. 470).
To quote Paluck (2016):
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What do social scientists know about reducing prejudice in the world? In short,
very little. Of the hundreds of studies on prejudice reduction conducted in recent
decades, only 11% test the causal effect of interventions conducted in the real
world (p. 147).
I developed my study to address that need.
Summary and Conclusions
The study of prejudice is one of the most voluminous fields in social science, but
as Paluck (2012; 2016) and Paluck and Green (2009) concluded in their reviews,
prejudice study and its reduction must branch out substantively to include more
qualitative real-life research. Research, too, should focus on deeply held prejudice and
probe prejudice reduction in the context of real-life conflict. This study examined the
experiences and attitudes of people who were raised in a “culture of conformism” and
who independently reversed their prejudices in order to gain some insight on how to
reduce prejudice in a real-world situation. This study used a social constructivist/ IPA
stance, where autobiographical narratives were investigated to uncover the significance
of the experience from the narrator’s perspective. It is hoped that the findings from this
study will help researchers and social-change practitioners treat the deeply-held prejudice
that comes from socialization. The following chapter outlines the methodology of the
study, reasons for using this method, and certain ethical concerns before it concludes with
the study’s limitations and implications.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
This study analyzed autobiographical data from digital, print, audio, and visual
sources from 21 defectors of insular faith societies to identify core themes associated
with their prejudice retractions. My research questions were the following:
RQ1: What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they disengage
and deradicalize?
RQ2: What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith
groups?
Paluck and Green (2009) noted that prejudice literature tends to neglect extreme
prejudice and focuses on prejudice in contrived laboratory situations, rather than in real
life settings. This study focused on people indoctrinated with extreme prejudice in
conflict environments and used a qualitative API method to gather the participants’
descriptions of their experiences.
Research Design and Rationale
I attempted to describe the “lived experience” of 21 individuals in violent closedfaith societies who independently reversed their socialized bias to outsiders. Paluck and
Green (2009) pointed out that few prejudice methodologies successfully treat prejudice
and those that do deal only with the weak to moderate bias of non-conflict regions. Most
prejudice-reduction studies study individuals who come from White, educated,
industrialized, rich, and democratic countries (Murrar, Gavac, and Brauer, 2016), rather
than individuals who experience the extreme type of prejudice that researchers need to
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study for conflict-resolution and peace. This dissertation used the phenomenological
approach to investigate the process of how subjects in this study evolved to question their
prejudices. I achieved this by analyzing their narratives to identify core themes of their
experiences during their transitions from prejudice to prejudice-renunciation. The study is
important because there are plenty of interventions that exist for treating weak to
moderate prejudice but none for treating extreme prejudice.
Role of the Researcher
Scott (2006) advised researchers who conduct exploratory studies to master four
qualities: Authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. Authenticity refers
to the accuracy of the narrative and the extent to which it matches historical reality. As
long as the crux of the story is true, it is considered authentic, even if the narrative
diverges from historical reality in minute aspects. Credibility refers to the extent to which
the biographer has exaggerated, or fabricated, aspects of the account. The documentary
researcher probes for motives of the biographer to test whether author bias distorted
aspects of the narrative. The researcher also considers whether the material is reliable, as
of whether writing and reflections are original or whether one, or both, are plagiarized.
According to Scott (2006), researchers can never fully determine whether narratives are
completely reliable, authentic, and credible. The best one can do is flip the interrogation
and question whether the sources can be considered inauthentic, noncredible, or
unrepresentative. The fourth quality, “meaning”, refers to a clear and coherent descriptive
authentically aligned to its historical context.
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McCullough (2004) described a “theorization” stance, where the researcher uses a
theoretical, hermeneutic framework for interpreting the material. Effective researchers
realize the way they interpret the material follows their unique experiences and may
differ considerably from the author’s intent. In other words, the author composed the
descriptive from his, or her, unique perspective; the reader, in this case the researcher,
interpreted the narrative from the researcher’s unique perspective. The two different
perspectives may result in utterly different understandings. Scott (2006) described three
phases where the meaning of the reading changes as it passes from writer to reader: The
transition of the intended content (i.e., the author’s intended meaning), the received
content (i.e., the meaning as constructed by the reader/perceiver), and the internal
meaning (i.e., transactional understandings derived from the intended and received
meanings). Recipients align the intended meaning to their own mental constructs.
Methodology
This study used an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) that is a
qualitative research method derived from the philosophical model of phenomenology.
Phenomenology advises researchers to see experience as-is, namely in its core essence. It
is also seen as the philosophical study of being, or existentialism. Researchers use the
phenomenological research methodology for descriptive or theoretical purposes. This
model is divided into two parts: Transcendental phenomenology that seeks to bracket or
suspend one’s interpretations, and descriptive phenomenology, influenced by thinkers
like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who alleged that humans are ontologically disabled
from bracketing their assumptions. According to descriptive phenomenology, the best
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one can do is to acknowledge one’s bias, seek to describe the phenomenon in its raw
manifestations, and replicate its truth. This position is often called hermeneutic
phenomenology, since it aims to interpret rather than to transcend assumptions (Larkin &
Thompson, 2011).
I chose IPA because it starts with the essence of the experience rather than with
the individual. Larkin and Thompson (2011) said IPA accomplishes “a meaning-making
that is conceptualized at the level of the person-in-context where we focus first on the
meaning of an experience (e.g., an event, process or relationship) to a given participant,
and recognize its significance for that participant” (p. 102). This idiographic approach
suited my purpose, since I was interested in the experiences that inspired my particular
subjects to retract their prejudice convictions. I also chose IPA, because it is commonly
used in mental health and therapy to study toxic attitudes that range from depression to
identity confusion (e.g., Smith and Osborn, 2007). Smith (2004) pointed out that IPA
studies frequently assess life-altering events, decisions, or conditions around existential
themes, which resonates with my dissertation.
Conceptual Framework
I used social constructivism as my theoretical base to bracket my bias. Social
constructivism assumes that “there is no objective knowledge independent of thinking”
(Grbich, 2007, p. 8) and that reality is socially embedded and exclusively exists in the
mind. I tried to hedge my assumptions and to concentrate on the text to retrieve the
essence of what it was that made my subjects change their attitudes. Grbich (2007)
claimed that the constructivist approach works well with studies that have characteristics
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of ethnography in that these studies involve “thick contextualized description and textual
perusal using discourse analysis” (p. 8).
Sample and Sources of Data
According to Clarke (2009), IPA studies achieve credibility even with small
sample sizes and the number of participants is reached when the analysis becomes
saturated. Sometimes, saturation, as in my case, may never be reached, so I relied on
Pietkiewicz and Smith (2014), who averaged the number of participants needed in IPA
models at 15 (although the trend is towards smaller sample sizes, such as eight to ten
individuals, with some IPA studies even declining to as few as four participants or even
to just one (Smith and Osborn, 2003). I settled for 21 case studies, although I came across
many more relevant accounts both before and while doing my research.
I used print and digital reports of writers who come from isolated faith
communities, where there was a certain taught intolerance to outsiders. Communities
included Jehovah Witness, Old World Amish (Old Order), extreme Muslim groups (like
Wahhabi or Salafi ideology), Haredi or Hassidic Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mormon
fundamentalism (FLDS Church), Christian fundamentalism (like Kingdom Identity
Ministries, Pentecostalism, or some Baptist and Evangelical fundamentalist groups), and
the Official Church of Scientology. Although the content of their education differed
between communities, a common denominator in their education was that teaching was
tied to the community and a spectrum of methods was used to raise barriers against the
outside world. Most of these communities imposed restrictions related to contact with the
outside. Censorship included limiting, if not banning, TV, radio, books, magazines,
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newspapers, movies and computers. The result inhibited members of such societies from
forming their own opinions. These are the subjects whose narratives I investigated.
Instrumentation
In our capacities as researchers, my assistant and I served as the instruments for
data collection. The narratives and background context of my subjects helped me
formulate questions and generate themes. I used an interpretive paradigm to investigate
the lived experiences of the subjects during all stages of their journeys. I also engaged the
assistance of an objective individual (a qualified student with no prior knowledge of my
research or reading) to replicate my reading and coding process, after which we identified
and resolved differences in our results.
I used a purposive sample of autobiographical texts that were compiled from
archival resources of print material from libraries, universities and colleges in six
countries and four US states. I also used digital audio and visual resources, as well as
material from chat groups, forums, and social media platforms (like Facebook). My
demographics spanned various extremist closed faith societies that indoctrinate their
members with intolerance and hostility to outsiders.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participant and Data Collection
I selected only subjects who were raised from birth in these isolated faith settings,
since I sought to discover why and how those individuals who lacked contact with a
wider world reversed their indoctrinations. For the same reason, I chose individuals
whose societies imposed an extreme form of censorship and who came from radically
isolated groups. Because I wanted to investigate extreme prejudice, I also chose closed
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societies where this attitude was part of their cultures. I, therefore, used Malise’s (2004)
definition of extremism to exclude certain isolated, although peaceful, groups, like
Hutterites and Mennonites, from my study.
Additionally, I focused on “push” rather than “pull” features. Research suggests
that “push” and “pull” features effect disengagement and deradicalization (or exit from
groups) (e.g., Reckless, 1961). “Pull” features are qualities outside of the group that
attract, while “push” factors are adverse characteristics of the group that repulse
(McAdam, 1986). Even though “push” and “pull” factors are integrated (without the
“push”, the “pull” would not seem so inviting and the reverse (McAdam, 1986)), I
focused on the “push” rather than on the “pull” to investigate motives for exit.
Data Analysis Plan
I closely reviewed each narrative, highlighting relevant excerpts and taking notes.
I followed each reading with a summary of the account. These I collated and condensed,
before I matched this summary against my original readings to verify whether my
assumptions correctly captured the intent, or lived experience, of the original texts. This
step is said to be the essence of IPA (e.g., Polkinghorne, 1989), where the researcher
moves between inductive and deductive positions and places subthemes under
superordinate categories. I also reproduced Willig’s (2001) four stages of initial
encounter with the text, identification of themes, clustering of themes, and final summary
of these themes. I verified that my summary accurately reflected experiences that could
be applied to the group as a whole.
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On top of that, I used social constructivism to bracket my bias and to enter the
mindset of the other. This required the approaches of bracketing, analyzing, intuiting, and
describing (Giorgi, 1970; Polkinghorne, 1989; Swanson, Kauffman & Schonwald, 1988).
Although each of these are separate items of descriptive phenomenology, I consistently
used the practice of all four to achieve a true understanding of the phenomenon under
study (Swanson-Kauffman & Schonwald, 1988).
Bracketing involved constantly monitoring my perceptions and bias and was
accomplished by taking “field notes” on my emotions and thoughts and using an
assistant. Analyzing was where I used five items of Colaizzi’s (1978) seven-step method
to guide my phenomenological analysis. More specifically, I reviewed the participants’
descriptions of the phenomenon at least twice to understand their accounts and to attempt
to “live” their experiences. I extracted core statements from the narratives that seemed to
encapsulate the phenomenon. I suggested possible meanings for significant statements. I
categorized these meanings into clusters of themes common to each of the narratives, and
I summarized these themes into an exhaustive description of the studied phenomenon.
I used the aspect of “intuiting”, a form of empathy (Colaizzi, 1978), to bracket my
perceptions, identity with the narrator’s experiences and feelings, and try to immerse
myself in their context for maximum identification. “Describing” was where I sought to
present a theoretical model that accurately and precisely summarized the phenomenon
under study and present universal implications (Colaizzi, 1978). Finally, I concluded with
the “data collection/clustering” stage, where I collated units of meaning from the texts
into particular themes (Sadala & Adorno, 2002) to elicit meanings from the studied

37
phenomenon. Colaizzi (1978) pointed out that this step may be the most creative of all,
since it involves a creative leap on the part of the researcher who deduces assumptions
from given excerpts.
Issues of Trustworthiness
My study included various questionable assumptions. First, I assumed that I can
extract certain insights from my limited population, although it is highly likely that a
larger autobiographical pool may produce different or contradictory indicators. Second,
autobiography lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which makes my study questionable
from the start. Third, I focused on socialized prejudice, ignoring the type of prejudice that
comes from traumatized experiences, such as terrorism (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001). This
means that my inferences may only relate to indoctrinated prejudice and have little to no
effect on the kind of extreme prejudice that originates from other factors.
Although quantitative research is, generally, considered more reliable than
qualitative research, scientists recommend qualitative methodology for studying affect
and human behavior. As Cameron (1963) stated, “Not everything that can be counted
counts, and not everything that counts can be counted” (p. 3). I, therefore, used a
qualitative method for my study. Finally, as Yin (1994) noted, document analysis
engenders a “biased selectivity”, where the researcher tends to select documents that
support his viewpoint and reflect her beliefs. I may have fallen into that trap, too, despite
my endeavors to hedge my bias with social constructivism and an assistant.
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Ethical Procedures
The IRB identifies exemptions for research that consists of a collection of existing
data that is publicly available. Since my research used publicly accessible data and did
not involve actual human participants, I violated no issue of confidentiality or privacy.
Summary
This chapter described the research methodology. My study used an IPA approach
to probe autobiographical accounts from multiple individuals raised in isolated faith
communities who independently reversed their socialized intolerance. The methodology
used social constructivism to bracket, analyze, intuit, and highlight key clusters of the
phenomenon, while I took field notes and employed an assistant to control bias.
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Chapter 4: Results
Chapter 4 shows how defectors from closed faith societies chose to retract their
indoctrinated prejudicial attitudes, despite being penalized for doing so. Each of the
defectors, whose accounts will be analyzed in this chapter, came from strongly cohesive
societies, also called “closed faith societies”, where pressure to conform was so intense
that their cultures formed their identities.
Sociological literature suggests that most participants of extremely controlling
religious or political groups have self-annihilating connections to their groups (e.g., Leary
& Baumeister, 1995). Isolated and socialized in these groups as they are, I wondered
how certain participants recognize the toxicity of their indoctrinations. I also wondered
what compelled these individuals to renounce their attitudes, knowing that they would be
punished for doing so. This chapter examines 21 such individuals, some of whom were
leaders in their groups. Several of these individuals participated in jihad and violence.
Many lost their spouses, close family, friends, and even children over their defections.
Most were unacquainted with world outside their communities. Some lost their jobs and
savings after rejecting their group’s bias. I wondered whether I could identify a pattern in
these renunciation accounts for understanding and dealing with extreme prejudice in real
life settings.
Most prejudice studies are conducted on campus settings in conflict-free
environments, making the results irrelevant to real-life situations (e.g., Paluck & Green,
2009). Most methods seem unsuitable for serious prejudice intervention (e.g., Paluck &
Green, 2009). Third, prejudice research focuses on weak to moderate bias and neglects
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extreme prejudice (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009). This study sought to investigate extreme
prejudice in a conflict-filled real-life context.
Positionality
I chose social constructivism for my theoretical approach to monitor and hedge
my bias. According to Grbich (2007), social constructivism assumes that “there is no
objective knowledge independent of thinking” (p. 8). This study has been a product of
more than 30 years of reading, reflection, personal experience and interviews with former
members of obedience-demanding, or closed faith enclaves, prompted by my own
experiences of leaving an isolated faith community that applauded and practiced
violence. I have also conducted wide and intensive reading on multidisciplinary and
related topics, more specifically on epistemology, ethnopsychology, religion, history,
anthropology, sociology, and advanced mathematics, along with my Master’s in
philosophy and advanced logics. I interviewed and worked with cults (e.g., Hari Krishna,
the Moonies), interviewed, taught, counseled, and worked with aspiring and actual
terrorists (e.g., Zionist and Palestinian) in the Middle East, interviewed, counseled, and
taught Neo-Nazis as well as former-communists (Hungary, Moldavia, Ukraine) and
regularly experience Trumpism, white supremacism and confederate loyalty in parts of
North Virginia and environs. My experiences gave me a unique insider perspective to this
study but also made me a subjective researcher, which is why I labored all the harder to
become aware of and hedge my bias. That’s where I though social constructivism would
be useful.
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Summary of Participants
I used criterion sampling for my study, choosing only participants who grew up in
isolated faith communities. Participants came from backgrounds that included Jehovah
Witness, Old World Amish (Old Order), extreme Muslim groups (like Wahhabi or Salafi
ideology), Haredi or Hassidic Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mormon fundamentalism (FLDS
Church), Christian fundamentalism (like Kingdom Identity Ministries, Pentecostalism, or
some Baptist and Evangelical fundamentalist groups), and the Official Church of
Scientology. A common denominator in their education was their ties to their
communities and the spectrum of methods used to raise strong barriers against the outside
world. According to Hammersborg (2005), insular faith communities establish an
understanding of “they” and “we”, where not even close relatives are part of the “we” if
they exist outside the community. Such communities generate fear of everything outside.
Children know that breaking out will result in severance from family and friends.
Defectors run the risk of being despised, excommunicated, and losing their footholds in
their communities (Hammersborg, 2005).
Some of these communities restrict contact with the outside, to the extent that
they ban outlets that include TV, radio, libraries, secular reading material, movies, and
internet. Former participants described it as "You are even not allowed to have free
thoughts” (Hammersborg, 2005, p.5). The result is a climate of growing up without
exposure to the “outside” world or the possibility for normal opinion forming, which
makes it all the more striking that exceptional individuals break out to challenge their
indoctrinations.
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These are their biographies:
•

Amir Ahmad Nasr - Nasr’s account in My Isl@m (2013), describes how the
internet transformed Nasr from a religious fundamentalist upbringing to a techsavvy liberal Muslim.

•

Ruth Irene Garrett - Crossing Over: One Woman's Escape from Amish Life (2003)
describes how Garrett grew up in and left her strict Old Order Amish sect.

•

Alisa Harris - In Raised Right: How I Untangled My Faith from Politics (2011),
Harris spent her childhood picketing abortion clinics and was homeschooled in
conservative-Republican Christianity but considered other perspectives when she
moved into adulthood.

•

Ayaan Hirsi - Hirsi, a Somali-born Dutch-American activist, feminist, author,
scholar, and former Dutch politician, spent the first 21 years of her life in an
extreme Muslim environment. Her writings include Nomad: From Islam to
America: A Personal Journey through the Clash of Civilizations (2011); Infidel
(2007); Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (2016); The Caged Virgin:
An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (2008).

•

Jenna Miscavige Hill - Hill, niece of Church of Scientology leader David
Miscavige, left Scientology in 2005. In Beyond Belief: My Secret Life inside
Scientology (2013), she details her experiences as a member of Sea Org - the
church's highest ministry and tells the story of her escape.
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•

Kyria Abrahams - I'm Perfect, You're Doomed: Tales from a Jehovah's Witness
(2010) is the story of Abrahams’ coming-of-age in, and defection from, Jehovah's
Witness.

•

Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out (2003) is written and edited by ex-Muslim
and secularist Ibn Warraq. The book documents more than 100 cases of apostasy
in Islam.

•

Sonsyrea Tate - Little X: Growing Up In The Nation Of Islam (2005) tells the
story of Tate whose growing disillusionment with the Nation of Islam led to her
break with the Muslim religion.

•

Rachel Held-Evans; Evolving in Monkey Town: How a Girl Who Knew All the
Answers Learned to Ask the Questions (2010) - Growing up in a Christian
fundamentalist culture obsessed with apologetics, Held-Evans asked questions she
never thought she would ask.

•

Carlene Cross - In Fleeing Fundamentalism: A Minister's Wife Examines Faith
(2006), Cross, a minister’s wife, questions the underpinnings of her
fundamentalist faith.

•

Yossi Klein-Halevi; Memoirs of a Jewish Extremist: The Story of a
Transformation (2014) - An award-winning Israeli journalist recounts his youth as
an activist in the Jewish terrorist Kach movement, and his eventual moderation
and advocacy of Jewish-Gentile reconciliation.
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•

Shulem Deen - In All Who Go Do Not Return (2015), Deen recounts how he grew
up in an insular Hassidic sect, was raised to know little about the outside world,
and soon found his faith unravelling.

•

Ed Husain; The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw
Inside and Why I Left (2007) is Husain’s account of how he committed his life to
Islamic fundamentalism and rejected it five years later to expose its threat.

•

Maajid Nawaz - Maajid Nawaz founded Quilliam, a globally active think tank
focusing on religious freedom, extremism and integration. Radical: My Journey
out of Islamist Extremism (2012) describes the journey of Nawaz from top
recruiter for Hizb ut-Tahrir to dissident.

•

Shoshi - Shoshi grew up in and rebelled against a radically insulated Hasidic
community. Her story comes from OffTheDerech, a website that interviews exHassids.

•

Anonymous - In “A moment that changed me: quitting the Jehovah’s Witnesses”
(The Guardian, 2016), Anonymous describes how she left Jehovah Witness and
questioned her ideas and beliefs.

•

Vyckie Garrison - Garrison, former leader in the Quiverfull Movement, describes
her deconversion in “It happened to me: I escaped the ‘Quiverfull’ fundamentalist
Christian cult” (xoJane, 2014).

•

Derek Black - A former white nationalist, godson of David Duke. Black is also
the son of Don Black, grand-wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, founder of the notorious
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white nationalist website, Stormfront. Black recounted his deconversion
experiences in “The white flight of Derek Black” (The Washington Post, 2016).
•

Dan Barker - The Purple Fox (YouTube, 2010). Barker, popular leader in the
Church of Christ, wrestled his faith, before he deconverted to atheism.

•

Christian Charette; From Fundamentalism to Freedom: My Story (2013).
Christian Charette, son of a Christian fundamentalist minister, and leader of
various churches, defected to urge tolerance for all faiths.

•

Joel Watts, author of the blog Unsettled Christianity - Watts grew up in The
Church of Jesus Christ. A fire-and-brimstone preacher and self-described Biblethumper, he left the church after 32 years and speaks out on the dangers of
repressive and rigid fundamentalist teachings. His interview appeared in
Innerviews: Spiritual saga traces break from fundamentalist church (Charleston
Gazette-Mail, 2014).
Data Coding
Bazeley (2009) warned of the unremitting struggle to achieve objectivity that

starts from the data collection stage itself, where I may choose accounts to match my
agenda. I followed Bazeley’s (2009) recommendations to focus on the context of the text,
its layers of description, the substance of the story related to my search, and to monitor
my ruminations.
I used Saldana’s (2015) four methods for coding, namely, attribute coding,
emotion coding, value coding, and narrative coding. Attribute coding identifies essential
information on the data and demographic characteristics of the participants. Emotion
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coding focuses on the emotions of the participants. Value coding investigates patterns in
belief statements or belief occurrences. Narrative coding searches for patterns in
individual narratives and in the narratives as a whole. I followed Bazeley’s (2009)
process of “feedback loops”, where I immersed myself in the narrative, and read each
account twice, concentrating on the second reading. This was followed by a third reading,
where I used Saldana's (2015) second-cycle coding methods, of “pattern coding” and
“focused coding”, to extract themes. I used “pattern coding” to examine my codes for
connections, following which I clustered these connections, or themes, and used “focused
coding” to summarize the results.
My associate conducted her own research producing her own conclusions. I
merged her themes with mine. The whole took one month of closely focused reading on
my part. (I had read most of the material in the past, so I was familiar with the
narratives). My associate spent almost three months reading the material and replicating
my methods. As each of us separately read the accounts, we looked for themes,
highlighted sections, and took notes of our reflections. We summarized our reflections
and findings before we proceeded to the next account. At the end, we collated the whole,
reviewed it for sense-meaning and contrasted it to the original narratives, before we
drafted a rough summary, as described above. Subsequent drafts were composed and
edited, until my associate and I agreed that our final production matched the accounts and
seemed to satisfy our research questions.
In the course of my study, I identified 291 statements that seemed to be
significant. I divided these statements into 15 categories, reduced to four clusters or

47
themes. My associate thought a motivational category should be added, by which she
meant the affective (emotional) domain of psychology, but I rejected that idea, since I
considered affect too vague, variant, and unpredictable and sought something specific
that people who deal with bigotry could use that transcends cultures and time. Second,
participates of cloistered groups may be driven to rebel for natural reasons like love or
sex or to escape abuse. I sought Hunsberger and Altemeyer’s (1995) “amazing apostates”
who defied their groups for cognitive reasons, so that social scientist could replicate my
results.
Emerging Themes
My IPA research led to four core themes that seemed to describe the phenomenon
under investigation. The first theme I called “As-Is”, where the beliefs of my subjects
collided with reality, and where “reality” was am incident discordant to their convictions.
In all cases, the phenomenon was marked by an abrupt cessation of faith that tended to
occur unexpectedly and against their wills. Those who encountered this phenomenon and
sought truth, retracted their prejudiced indoctrinations. I called the second theme critical
thinking, where subjects conducted analytical reading of their core texts to resolve doubts
and/or to proselytize. Jarring encounters with discordant text challenged their beliefs. My
third theme was wide reading, where subjects recounted analyzing core multidisciplinary
texts from subjects like history, anthropology, sociology or comparative religion and
found that facts challenged convictions. Finally, I added a fourth theme of altruism,
where an outsider’s generosity contradicted stereotypes of demonization held by the
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subject’s particular group. Although this theme has evaluative shadowing’s, I included it
because of its cognitive component where the subject ruminated on their experiences.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
According to Yin (2003), researchers who conduct exploratory studies need to
master the four qualities of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning.
Authenticity refers to reflecting on the truth of the document and on whether it accurately
conveys the broader story of the author, even as nuances diverge from reality. I relied on
eyewitness testimony, publishing house credibility, and reviews to verify authenticity.
The second quality of credibility is whether the author exaggerated or fabricated one or
more details. I relied on the sources stated above for narrative credibility, although I
allowed for certain points of distortion. Third was whether the material was “reliable”, in
whether it was plagiarized, or accurately reflected the author’s perceived experiences.
Since one can never fully determine whether documents are completely reliable,
authentic, and credible, I followed Scott (2006) prescription and questioned whether the
sources were inauthentic, non-credible, or unrepresentative. I judged them neither of
these for the reasons given above.
Finally, the quality of “meaning” rests on whether the evidence is clear and
comprehensible, and on the authenticity of its historical and geographical context.
Although my experience is limited to only one close faith group, I have spoken to
members of others over the years and read enough material to roughly validate the
context.
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My study is limited in its transferability in that it is based on various questionable
assumptions. First, a larger population would likely have produced additional, varying or
contradictory results. Second, autobiography lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which
makes my study questionable from the start. Third, my population reflect extreme
prejudice from socialization, while extreme prejudice also derives from trauma (Bar-Tal
& Labin, 2001), possibly rendering the implications of my study irrelevant to atypical
exemplars.
The Themes
Theme 1: As-Is
I see this “As-Is” theme as the overarching theme, where the subject had his or
her belief system shaken in an unexpected encounter with a threat to their convictions.
This “As-Is” encounter could also be described as a phenomenological occurrence, where
the perceiver came face-to-face with the actual and had his or her “eyes opened.” Many
of the subjects used expressions that indicated as much. Garett (2003), for instance, said
“My mind was a tornado. [After] that moment I felt as though I had been flying blind for
years” (p. 20). Cross (2006) described her studies as a light that broke through “the fog”
(p. 131). Hirsi (2005) said the religious and cultural contradictions confused her “she
couldn't see straight” (p. 32). Later, she said “the “little shutter” in the back of her brain
opened and thoughts came tumbling out (p. 104). Held-Evans (2010) only knew that
“sometime in my late teens or early twenties, it was as if Jesus packed his bags and
moved from my heart into her head” (p. 105).
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Held-Evans’ faith-infused content of Jesus representing “faith”, heart”, or “spirit”
changed to a Jesus of “atonement”, “logos”, “the object [italics mine] of my faith”, and
“absolute truth”. The first are effective descriptions, the last are cognitive terms. She,
also, noted that “[Jesus] was something I agreed to, not someone I followed” (p. 105). I
noted the conversion of subject, “someone I followed”, into object, “something I agreed
to”.
Anonymous (2003) described how her faith was impacted by her critical reading
of the Quran. Once done, “I found myself standing face-to-face with the truth” (p. 148) an intimate encounter, not protected from denial. She elaborated: “The denial acts as a
shield that covers [believers], that protects them and that saves them from facing the pain
of shock and disillusionment. Once that shield is up nothing can break it down.” (p. 148).
What believers need, Anonymous (2003) insisted “is a good shock.” Think of shock in its
literal sense as a force that jolts individuals into encounter with the feared unknown.
“Shocks are used by doctors to bring back to life clinically dead patients.” (p. 148).
Further: “The word faith means belief without evidence,” You need, she says, “to
bombard Muslims with ‘facts’” (p. 149). I called this category, the “As-Is”.
The triggers were unpredictable, largely unsought for and unavoidable. In The
Purple Fox, Barker (2010) described an Evangelical woke of all-day singing and Church
Prayer Meeting, with thousands of Church youth participating from all over the United
States. At some point, he disassociated from himself and saw himself as just someone
playing a guitar to entertain the crowd. As he suddenly saw it, it was the instruments, not
the Spirit of God, as he had believed, that spurred crowd epiphany.
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Deen (2015) recounted his Hasidic experiences and how for the first time he saw
God’s Ambassador as human. In Deen’s (2015) words, each Passover, Hasidim would
compare the number of seconds the rabbi wept and analyze the smallest signs of
spontaneity: “The rabbi wept this year more than last” (p. 15). They argued over the
milliseconds: “this year he wept only once, but for a twenty-three second stretch” (p. 15)
- all this to mine for some hidden meaning of mysticism, some tip for self-improvement,
some secret message from the Rebbe that was supposed to have infinities of significance.
One Passover, Deen (2015) watched how followers crawled the rafters and
pushed to get nearer to the diminutive man sipping his soup at the head of the table. Deen
reflected:
[That] day, I began to wonder. Where exactly was the Rebbe’s greatness? Was he
a scholar? Was he a saint? Had he ever shown anyone any exceptional kindness?
How would one even know it, considering that he was barely accessible to his
followers, his acts so meticulously scripted, his public utterances limited to
carefully prepared thoughts of little consequence, private audiences always brief
and perfunctory, five minute consultation after a five-hour wait. (p. 15)
Deen’s (2015) ruminations seemed a perfect example of As-Is, where he reduced
myth to empirical occurrence. Deen says:
I thought about the Rebbes of other sects – so many of them, of late consumed by
squabbles. The squabbles were often coated in veneers of piety, but the
differences were rarely matters of principle or ideology. They were about power
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and control. And real estate. Millions of dollars in properties and institutions and
the great communal wealth amassed by each sect. (pp. 15-16)
The extraordinariness of this reflection is that it was done by someone dedicated
to his rabbi with no access to outside material or outside knowledge for contrast. (Deen
lacked radio, libraries, the internet, a fundamental education). In contrast, Deen’s wife,
Gitty, chose faith over fact. “Our Rebbe,” she insisted, “was not to be questioned. I was
taught to have faith in the righteous” (p. 16). Again, Deen used As-Is to challenge his
wife’s response:
What did it mean to have faith in the righteous? Was it to have faith in their very
righteousness? There was something maddeningly circular about that – how did
one know if they were righteous enough to have faith in? By faith? (p. 16).
Hirsi’s (2007) As-Is moment came when she saw Holland for the first time and
saw that contrary to what she ha been taught, the Dutch were happier, healthier, and more
functional than her own culture in all ways. Says Hirsi (2007):
The streets were clean, the shopfronts gleamed, no potholes, no lecherous men
called me to bed with them. No Brotherhood members threatened women with
hellfire. No homeless. No slums, no people who lived on top of one another. No
government corruption… I remember thinking ‘This is amazing, how can it be
so?’ I felt I had been thrown into another world. I was Alice in Wonderland.
(Infidel, 2007, p. 185)
Hirsi’s rebellion shows the As-Is each step of the way. When ten, she wondered
why she should convert Christians, if Allah had destined them for hell. By 17, she
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wondered why Muslims had to attack non-Muslims for a religious state, if Allah was
omnipotent. And if God were all-merciful, why were women victimized?
Hill (2005) described her boyfriend’s break with the Church of Scientology, after
he was shunned, despite Church teachings that God forgave repentant sinners. “Dallas,”
she remembered, “was in disbelief. The contradictions of the Church were on full
display; perhaps more clearly than ever before he saw how the Church said one thing and
meant another” (p. 501). Other As-Is events included how both were startled to discover
that few outsiders had heard of Church of Scientology founder, L. Ron Hubbard, contrary
to what they had been taught, and that most outsiders were kind and good. When it came
to watching TV for the first time:
I found myself a bit surprised that what I saw didn’t match what I'd learned in
Scientology. We were taught that homosexuals were perverts and hostile...
However, when I watched these guys on television they didn't strike me as any of
those things. (p. 517)
Similarly, Held-Evans (2010) described how one Mormon missionary said: “I
guess after you spend so much time in another country, you start to realize how similar
everyone really is, how there’s not that much difference between us” (p. 84). The
Muslims they encountered considered themselves God’s Elect and tool for spreading the
Truth, just as they, the Mormons, did. Said Held-Evans (2010): “The guy who pushed a
button somewhere and blew up my vehicle - the guys [who were] brought up in an alien
faith and taught to kill themselves or blow himself up at checkpoints” (p. 84). “Most of
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them, too,” she reflected, “are doing just what they sincerely believe to be God’s will.
Most are just as passionate and screwed up as the rest of us.” (p. 84).
In Held-Evans (2010), a missionary friend reflected:
I’ve gotten to know some Muslims pretty well and that’s really changed my
perspective. They're not all violent fundamentalists. They don't all hate America.
In fact, the Muslim guy that helped me learn Arabic is a heck of a lot more
devoted to his faith than most Christians I know. … It’s hard for me to say ‘Hey,
you're going to hell because you didn't grow up in a Christian home like me.’ (p.
85)
This As-Is incident was compounded by others, where Held-Evans (2010) saw
innocent children killed and was tormented that their Jesus-believing killers would enter
paradise while their victims were for hell. After reading Anne Frank’s diary, she wrote
“For weeks, I prayed diligently for Anne’s departed soul” (p. 92).
To Yossi Klein-Halevi (2014), it was his non-Jewish girlfriend who perplexed
him. If all non-Jews hated Jews as his culture said, how come she had never heard of
Jews and how was it she liked him despite his Jewishness? “My father had warned me
that a gentile woman would betray her Jewish lover in their first fight, calling him ‘dirty
Jew’. Lyn and I sometimes fought, but my father was wrong” (p. 206). Another time, a
homeless person who was Irish, told him he had fought for Israel in 1948. Klein-Halevi
was nonplussed: “What was a non-Jew doing fighting for Israel instead of fighting to
destroy it” (p. 301). In time, Klein-Halevi (2014) wondered whether the Jews were as
friendless as his community had told him, and “whether the ‘righteous Gentiles’ as we
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condescendingly called our allies, were really rare exceptions” (p. 200). Culminated
doubts from these As-Is encounters led to his leaving the terrorist Kahane Chai (Kach)
group.
Klein-Halevi wasn't the only one disturbed by contradictions between teachings
and reality. Husain (2007) pondered why his non-Muslim university teachers showed
genuine concern when they discussed Islam. The Hizb had insisted that university
professors criticized Islam. Husain (2007) noted, “The exceptionally friendly Professor
Judd, [and others] openly discussing the merits of Muslim identity in British India and
the exploitation of these sentiments by egotistical politicians… hardly conformed to that
stereotype” (p. 158).
Abrahams (2010) was told that gentiles who included people like Mother Theresa,
the Dalai Lama, or Elie Wiesel, would go to hell. It confounded her that one of her
Gentile friends, who was so ordinary “[she] liked Tears for Fears, button candy and
making prank calls” (p. 32) could be a bad influence. As she saw it, there were people in
her community who abused their children, beat their wives, connived, and drank. How
were these people holy and Mother Theresa evil? Further As-Is questions, like these,
corroded her convictions. Tate (2005), too, was oppressed by these same observations,
where certain white people seemed better, kindlier, and more honest than some of her
Muslim Brotherhood teachers. Her teachers taught her that God wanted her to use all her
talents, while at the same time He only wanted her to be an obedient wife and mother.
Anomalies like these confused her.
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To Shoshi of OffTheDerech, it was “Little incidents of non-Jews being kind,
something we were told they weren’t, or my finger staying intact after accidentally
turning the light on Shabbos, not dying after eating candy on Yom Kippur (fast day),
etc.” (n.d., online). She also mentioned being disturbed by hypocrisy, something that
appears in many of my narratives. It seems to me that hypocrisy may be reduced to the
same As-Is concept, where the defector notices that parent, teacher, or respected
members of the community violate what they preach. There is a misalignment between
teaching (where all are said to be holy or to tread a certain path) and fact (where deeds
negate doctrine).
I noticed this phenomena with Deen (2015), where Deen was disturbed by
incidents where community members, including the Rebbe, perpetrated acts that
contradicted their teachings. One time, some followers burned the possessions of a
“questionable” student. Another time, they torched the home of someone who chose
another rabbi. Some followers stoned lost non-Jewish drivers. As Deen (2015) came into
contact with the world, he noticed that both religious and secular Jews outside his group
knew more about Judaism than he. The world was more varied, Jews more diverse,
practicing Jews were not all Chassidic as his rabbis, or sect, had told him. “I soon
discovered a world of people entirely different from anyone I knew” (p. 128). This,
among other incidents, “shattered the narrative he had been given” (p. 128).
Later, I came across two other incidents of As-Is that fit the conditions of the
research. The first occurred in the 2014 Lifetime movie Outlaw Prophet: Warren Jeffs. In
the 1970s, Jeffs started his own isolated Mormon polygamous sect of about 50 followers,
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where members were taught to distrust outsiders and all followers were ordered to kill
those their Prophet instructed them to. One of the group’s Apostles reneged when he
noticed that events turned out differently from the Prophet’s prophecy. He thought: If the
Prophet erred this time, how often had he erred in the past. The man left to direct cult
deprogramming programs.
The second account is from Taylor (2017) who described her defection from her
fundamentalist Church on her blog, “I Dare You":
I was sitting in my high school homeroom listening to morning devotions when
the name Bill Gothard was introduced and his ten rules for marriage were
pronounced “Biblical.” I remember my shy, yet outraged hand flying into the air
as if propelled by something more than nerves and muscles. “Where are these
rules in the Bible? This should not be called a Bible study,” I demanded. I went
home, disgusted. (para. 5)
Taylor (2017) took “Biblical” literally. As she saw it, the Bible omitted Gothard’s rules,
therefore they could not be called Biblical. If Gothard was wrong here, his other
teachings could be wrong, too. These are examples of the As-Is theme, where the subject
encountered hard events or facts that shook their convictions.
Sub-theme One: Critical thinking
Certain subjects seemed to lose their faiths after a concentrated reading of primary
sources. Anonymous (2016), for instance, remarked:
I’m grateful every day for my education and my desire to learn and think
independently, a skill that fostered in me those initial doubts about Jehovah’s
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Witnesses, and enabled me to have the strength to search for answers elsewhere in
unbiased literature. (para. 8)
In other words, her training to analyze texts eventually corroded her bias.
Anonymous (2003) described how he read the Quran in English and was rattled
by the results. He was, as he said “the typical religious fundamentalist, trapped in my
own world of conspiracies; the Jews are behind everything” (p. 15). A chance encounter
with an online group of Muslims caused him to read the Koran in English:
Prior to joining this organization, I hadn't read the Koran in English, instead
reading it in Arabic (believing this would bring me Swaab - blessings). When I
read it for the first time, I became very worried by the amount of violence in the
texts. Subsequent late night sessions with the Koran convinced me that I was
reading a text to war. (p. 127)
Nasr (2013) self-imposed project included studying Islamic history and analyzing
Koranic and Hadeira verses. He read the religious texts in English instead of in rote
Arabic:
I was dumbstruck. Is this really what Islam says about fellow human beings? Is
this truly what my love stands for and advocates? I dug into the Quranic verses
that supposedly said Jews were ’turned’ into pigs and apes … The interpretation
varied (p. 108)
Anonymous (2003) cited an ex-Muslim who said that:
My apostasy against Islam came about through a sustained critical analysis of the
fundamental tenets of all regions, thus opening the way towards self-criticism. …
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It slowly dawned on me that the Koran was not the infallible, immutable word of
God, but a fascist slur on humanity, a human document with little relevance to the
modern condition as well as the realization of the countless contradictions,
historical inconsistencies and errors and some of the most intolerant verses ever
written. (p. 209)
Husain (2007) found his religious doubts deepened by critical reading of source texts. His
teachers, for instance, had told students to disobey parents who discouraged them from
martyrdom, but the Koran demanded parental respect:
How could people in the Hizb reject their parents so easily? Don’t they know
about the man who wanted to go on a military expedition and the Prophet said
that looking after elderly parents was more important than jihad? (p. 155).
Anonymous (2003) said her critical reading of the Koran left her utterly
disillusioned. “I had read the whole thing and could no longer fool myself, saying that
these inhumane verses were taken out of context” (p. 148). Further:
The whole Quran is full of verses that teach the killing of the unbelievers and tell
how Allah will route them after they die. There are very few lessons on morality,
of justice, honesty or on love. The only message the entire book conveys is to
believe in Allah and to achieve this, it coaxes people with celestial rewards of
unlimited sex with fair houris in Paradise and coerces them with the threat of
blazing fires of hell. (p. 148)
Anonymous (2003) reflected:
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When the Koran speaks of righteousness, it does not really mean righteousness as
we intend it, but it means belief in Allah. Good actions are irrelevant; belief in
Allah is the ultimate purpose of a person’s life and of the entire creation. (p. 148)
Hirsi (2007) opened the Koran to assuage her doubts:
If God were merciful, then why did Muslim have to shun non-Muslims - even to
attack them, to establish a state based on Allah’s laws? If He is just, then why
were women so downtrodden? I began collecting together all the verses in the
Quran that said God was wise, God was omnipotent, God was just… I pondered
them.” (Infidel, 2007, p. 33)
One sees the As-Is clearly with Hirsi (2007) when she concluded:
Clearly in real life, Muslim women were not ‘different but equal’ as her teacher,
Sister Aziza had maintained. The Quran said ‘men rule over women’. In the eyes
of the law and in every detail of daily life, we were clearly worth less than men.
(p. 102)
Hirsi’s teachers warned her she was Satan's instrument. So,
I bought my own English edition of the Quran and read it so I could understand it
better. But I found that everything Boqol Sawm [a particularly fanatical preacher]
had said was in there. Women should obey their husbands. Women were worth
half a man. Infidels should be killed. (2007, p.104)
In other words, the As-Is, or literality, of the Koran, defeated the deep indoctrination of
her group.
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Held-Evans (2010) desperately wanted to believe, so she collected evidence “for
the little trial I was conducting in my head” (p. 97). This included looking into evolution,
reading about comparative regions, and confronting an unflattering history of her church.
“I studied troubling biblical texts that seemed to support slavery, misogyny, violence and
ethnic cleansing” (p. 97). As-Is doubts accumulated: If God is good and merciful then
why did he command Joshua to kill every man, woman and child? That seems to be
genocide. How could God be fair and just if most people face eternal damnation? It
seemed a little suspicious that the only true religion was the one she happened to grow up
in.
She tried to read the Testament as though she were seeing it for the first time: “If
someone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Love your enemies and pray
for those who persecute you. Do not store up for yourself treasure on earth. Do not judge”
(p. 98). She realized these Biblical teachings contradicted Church practices. Her church,
for instance, applauded decadent, godless and immoral celebrities, politicians, and
billionaires, as well as rationalized behavior that the Bible called “evil”. Far from
forgiving, the Church was intent on retribution, on setting boundaries and on despising
people like the homeless and needy. Held-Evans (2010) concluded, “The teachings of
Jesus fly in the face of all we are told by our culture and even by the church” (p. 104). In
fact, “as I grew more acquainted with the Gospels [I realized] that Jesus had a very
different view of faith than the one to which I was accustomed” (p. 104). Far from being
the elect, or the Lamb of Jesus, absorption in the text showed Held-Evans (2010) that
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God helped all sorts of people from pagans to despots, regardless of their creed. This AsIs accumulation of contradictions made Held-Evans admit “I was [a] skeptic” (p. 97).
Cross (2006) studied world history to reinforce her faith, and found material that
made her question her Christian fundamentalist lifestyle. Intensive historical research
showed her there were hundreds of books purporting to be the exclusive testimonies of
Jesus and that it was only because of the subjective wrangling of a certain Council of
Nicaea that an arbitrary 66 books were chosen for “Holy Scripture”. Fundamentalist
apologetics rang hollow:
I remember the day, sitting at the kitchen table while the girls wrote their lessons,
when I closed my history book and stared out in the blank openness of the
universe. If, instead of God’s direct revelation from heaven, the Bible was simply
a compilation of religious writings that supported an emerging third-century
religious sect, fundamentalist Christianity was a house of cards. Its cornerstone
belief that the Bible was without error and thus could be used as a textbook for
modern ethics was patently absurd. (p. 133)
This made Cross (2006) investigate the roots of Christianity “letting historical
evidence, rather than religious fervor, lead the way” (p. 134). She delved into church
history and anthropology, philosophy, comparative religions, and sociology and,
gradually, found facts defeating faith. One sees a replication of the same As-Is theme,
where focus on the literalness of key texts, or primary sources, results in an immediate
encounter (somewhat like the Buberian I-Thou experience) that defeats years of
indoctrinated teachings, like hostility to outsiders.
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Sub-Theme Two: Clashes of Information
Broad reading, or exposure to other ideas, was another path that seemed to cause
subjects to reverse their prejudices. Deen’s (2015) rebellion developed with the internet,
radio and the local library. Cross’ (2006) questions developed with classes that included
comparative history, philosophy, and literature. She delved into church history and
anthropology, philosophy, comparative religions, and sociology, and was disturbed to
discover Church diagrams refuted by the historical record. “History showed that the New
Testament was not an errorless document that had been dedicated by God to the apostles
shortly after the death of Jesus” (p. 131).
Husain (2007) changed his mind on kafir (i.e., infidels) through the following: “I
started to read as widely as possible about representative government, freedom and
democracy and realize that these were all contested concepts... reflecting different social
and political realities in different countries” (p. 159). Islamic radicalism, he noted, was
rooted in rejection of the West. Its hatred was a legacy of the group, not of the Koran, and
it was the group, not the Koran, that institutionalized intolerance.
One of Husain’s professors showed how history and the present was generated by
a past open to multiple interpretations. Husain (2007) learned that historical records do
not necessarily tell us what happened, but only what their authors wanted us to know
about what happened or the author's perceptions on the event. The Hizb prided
themselves on “their intellectual purity” as “carriers of deep enlightened thought” (p.
160), but Husain (2007) wondered whether their intentions were really as pure as they
claimed, or whether these intentions were constructions of their periods. He had to sever
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himself from his faith-infused environment (“Away from the halaqah, in a free
intellectual atmosphere” [p. 160]) to conclude that heretics were only called kafir because
they opposed accepted custom. To be called a heretic, he concluded, was subjective,
making hating outsiders irrational.
Hirsi (2007) gained her solace from Western books. “The more I learned about
government, about the development of the individual, about systems of thought on social
democracy and liberalism ... the more I preferred things this way” (Infidel, 2007, p. 248).
When she contrasted the West to her cultural experiences, she concluded that “the
concept of individual choice improved people's lives so visibly... I was enamored of the
idea that you should think precisely and question everything and build your own
theories” (p. 248). Her As-Is experiences and study generated cognitive dissonance.
Held-Evans’ (2010) “most liberating moment “came, she writes, when she delved
into world religions, history, sociology and anthropology and “discovered, as if for the
first time, the diversity of my own religious tradition” (p. 131). Christianity alone had
thousands of different creeds. Mormonism, in turn, was split into dozens more. Who was
to say her Church owned the Truth.
To summarize, critical exposure to other ideas seems to have been another factor
causing subjects to question their socialized prejudices. The same As-Is theme occurs
where subjects seemed compelled by their absorption in primary sources to question their
convictions.
Sub-Theme Three: A surprise encounter that showed the goodness and altruism of
the demonized other.
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This theme refers to unexpected encounters with the demonized other, or
“outsider”, where the other proved kinder, better, and more compassionate than
stereotyped by the group. It is another instance of As-Is, since the reality contradicts
group teachings.
Harris (2011) described how moved he was seeing an “apostate” minister humbly
use his own resources to feed homeless adults who lived under bridges. He concluded
that this was real Christian love not the kind practiced by his particular group, who
strapped placards to shoulders and blasted homosexuals. This unanticipated face-to-face
encounter with pure goodness, shattered indoctrination and shook his fidelity to his
Church. Love doesn't happen, he writes, by being isolated from the world and by only
donating to one’s community. Rather, it happens by interacting with the world and by
contributing to the whole universe. Real love must be seen to be believed. This kindness
was a more incarnational love than that practiced by his group. Says he “I knew it when I
saw it.” (p. 20). Note the emphasis on seeing and realness.
Husain (2007) had been attracted to Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb ut-Tahrir because
they claimed to represent true Islam and to perfect the world, but after one vicious group
meeting he wondered. “Where was all the brotherhood we spoke about? On the bus home
that day, for the first time in years, I cried” (p. 110). Over time, he wondered whether
Islam had anything to offer and soon realized he was confounding Islamism with Islam.
The disillusionment of Nawaz (2013) started in Pakistan, with the As-Is
disconnect with leaders’ preaches and their brutality. Nawaz (2013), jailed for killing
non-Muslims, was confounded when Amnesty International freed him because it was the
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“right” thing to do. He remarked, “As I got sucked into the Islamist ideology, I began to
dehumanize others [while Amnesty] instead of dehumanizing people, it dehumanized
them” (p. 184). This As-Is perspective made him question his willingness to kill infidels:
“Instead of being fascinated with the afterlife and death, for the first time in many years I
began to reconnect with life itself, and with humanity” (p. 185).
Nawaz (2013), also, scrutinized Islamic history and found a “rather different
story” than what the Hizb-a-Tihr (HT) had told him. He noted, for example, that not only
had the Caliphate lacked the unitary codified legal system that HT advocated as a “return
to the old”, but that it was a far more flexible, tolerant, and pluralistic and more
compassionate system than his own. When he came into contact with outsiders in jail, he
contrasted the violent and farcical behavior of his teachers with the gentle and humane
conduct of the demonized other. “I had always been taught - and had passionately
believed - that the presence of Islamism meant justice, and the absence of it created
injustice. But now I began to see things differently” (p. 92).
To summarize, this “altruism” theme, where kindness done by the demonized
other contradicts prejudiced teachings also contains an As-Is theme, where subjects
collide with a phenomenological essence that breach their convictions.
Connection to the Research Questions
The sample population. Each of the subjects grew up in closed faith settings,
where group leaders emphasized their elites, while derogating outsiders. Members of
these groups were taught to fear the unknown and to distrust any system of knowledge
that differed from theirs. As Hammersborg (2005) writes, members knew that breaking-
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out would mean rejection from family and friends. Shoshi (n.d.), for example, was
brought up in a community so small that “once you are OTD you can’t really walk
around the frum [i.e. “pious”] area without meeting people you know, and some people
will make your visits uncomfortable by publicly telling you off, screaming at you or at
best ignore you” (para.2; online). There were no organizations to help defectors, while
members who rebelled were told they had a mental illness. Shoshi grew up with ten
siblings. She writes that they:
Were extremely frum [i.e. “pious”]. We spoke only Yiddish, the girls always had
to wear tights outside of the bedroom, and always had to dress modestly.
Newspapers or fiction books were not allowed to enter the house, even the frum
yiddish newspapers were considered schmutz [dirty] ... My mother vocally
opposed anything secular, and would consistently contact the school and teachers
about anything that she considered excessive promotion of English language and
ideas such as a sketch based on the book Heidi or a song with English lyrics.
(Online; para. 6)
Husain (2007) was taught he was a better, purer, and superior Muslim to others
and that others who were kafir, namely non-religious or only “partial Muslim”, deserved
his scorn and hostility.
Hostility could become vicious. Nasr’s (2013) teachers, for instance, asked each
child what they wanted to be when they grew up, then warned them that Jews would
destroy their dreams. The students were trained to stand up and chorus “The Jews are our
enemies. They kill innocent people every day… They drink [your] blood” (p.35).
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Ruth Garrett (2003) described how:
As Old Order Amish children, we were taught that we were the privileged ones,
chosen by God to do his work and the only ones who stood a chance of being
saved. We were also warned that everything outside our world, otherwise known
as English, was evil, inhabited by thieves and liars. (p 8)
The Jehovah Witness sect of Abrahams (2010) taught her that “worldly” people corrupted
her. She was forbidden to play with “worldly” friends and was taught to pray “go away
Satan” to diminish their influence:
If I had to quote one scripture that was drilled into our brains from children, it
would be 1 Corinthians 15.33, which reads ‘do not be misled; bad associations
spoil useful habits.’ It didn't matter what kind of person you were. People who
were Jehovah Witnesses were considered good associations, and that was where
the creditor for fishing ended. Sure, some people might appear to be nice on the
outside. They may even claim to be Christian. But Satan, they were told, used
them as opportunity to lead Jehovah Witnesses astray. Sin, they were over and
again taught, lurks in their hearts... The point was, if someone wasn't a JW, he
was going to die at Armageddon, and there was no point in befriending the
condemned. (p. 470)
Anonymous (2016) described how she was taught to distance herself from
Gentiles:
I was warned away from cultivating any close friendships with non-Jehovah’s
Witnesses”. The process of leaving was so intimidating that “most young
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Witnesses grow up sequestered in their homes and their congregations, fearful of
anything outside those boundaries. If at any point you do have doubts and want to
leave, your forced isolation up to that point makes the decision inevitably
intimidating and potentially overwhelming because of the prospect of being alone
and without a support network to guide you through the process (online; para. 6).
When she left the faith at age 18, her best friends shunned her and attributed her
apostasy to material weakness and greed.
Tate (2005) was taught that America was “the most vile and wicked nation on
Earth, one that would be destroyed” (p. 30). Indoctrination started from kindergarten on:
Every day we were drilled on a few of our twenty-five Actual Facts… we were
taught that our God, who came to North America in the form of Master W. Fard
Muhammad, measured the Earth, all the other planets and the distance between.
This God wanted us to memorize the widths and weights of all the planets, our
teachers said, because someday we black people, especially when few of us
chosen for the Nation of Islam, would rule the world… By age six I could rattle
off facts and figures in cadence. (p. 30)
Each of these authors was taught to condemn outsiders. Many of them were
taught to hate. Some were brought up to harm and kill others and were applauded by their
communities for doing so.
Hirsi’s lecturers indoctrinated their students to hate the West and Jews:
Sister Aziza told us about the Jews. She described them in such a way that I
imagined them as physically monstrous: they had horns on their heads, and noses

70
so large they stuck right out of their faces like great beaks. Devils and djinns
literally flew out of their heads to mislead Muslims and spread evil. Everything
that went wrong was the fault of the Jews... Saddam Hussein was a Jew. The
Americans were controlled by Jews. The Jews controlled the world and that was
why we had to be pure: to resist this evil influence. (Infidel, 2007, p. 85)
Nuqul Sawm, a popular preacher, was one of the many young men belonging to
the Muslim Brotherhood, who strode through the streets and screamed “at the top of their
lungs” (Hirsi, 2007, p. 85) for citizens to hate infidels. Hirsi (2007) described how such
preachers gained thousands of converts as well as donations, with some women donating
their dowries. This irrational, extreme hatred penetrated all aspects of life. This is not the
type of prejudice studied on liberal American campuses where researchers do IAT tests
on black-and-white racism. It is a racism manifested by a conflict-ridden society,
socialized by years of indoctrination.
Other subjects like Deen (2015) and Klein-Halevi (2014) may not have joined
Jihads, but their environments applauded and sanctified violence to apostates and
outsiders. Klein-Halevi (2014) grew up among Holocaust survivors from Eastern Europe
who passed on their traumas:
In the yeshiva I attended we got a children's magazine called Olomeinu, Our
World - an appropriate name, because nothing non-Jewish, extra systemic
penetrated its pages… Some Borough Park children said it was a mitzvah, a
religious commandment, to spit when you passed a church. An alternative opinion
held that it was forbidden to even walk within spitting distance of a church. There
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was a big church… near Eighteenth Avenue, and I’d cross the street rather than
pass it. If I got too close, grasping hands might suddenly emerge from its massive
doors and drag me into the basement, where priests would imprison me and force
me to become a Christian. (p. 15)
In time, Klein-Halevi determined that he “wanted to be a protector and an avenger like
Yossi Katz, a “big boy” who single-handedly prevented a pogrom in a Hungarian village.
Had Tate (2005), who lived in Brooklyn, too, met Katz, she would have hated him because he was Jewish and White and she Muslim and Black. Tate’s uncles boasted how
they attacked Whites for fun. “I guess we was about, eleven or twelve, ok,” one uncle
tells her, “and we had this little club called the White Hunters Club… what we used to
do, okay, was, we would go around,” he paused for drama, “and beat up white people” (p.
25). They would hide in bushes near Union Station, “all of us in a group”, see a White
lady (it usually was the women who were more vulnerable), kick her in the legs, and run.
Their uncles were respected in the Temple, where preachers demonized Whites.
The Research Questions
1. What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they
disengage and deradicalize?
Initially, each of the subjects sought to retain their convictions. Their identities
were tied up with their groups, and they knew how much they would lose were they to
challenge or defy group ideas. All of my subjects lost friends, family members, and their
sense of identities, along with their status in their groups as they transitioned. Most had to
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deal with a strange world, which was foreign to them and where they knew no one. They
had no support, nor the education and know-how to deal with this outside world.
Agonizing religious doubt was another common aspect. Most of my subjects
pushed back on their questions and many started their investigations to quell their
doubts... For most, their defection was a spotty, circuitous, grueling journey. Tate (2005),
for instance, tried to tell herself that Satan was testing her and her religious doubts were
for self-improvement. At one point, she became suicidal:
Some nights I curled up on the window sill and wondered if I jumped where I
would die before my body hit the ground below. That way I could die without
feeling the pain. I was tired of living, tired of thinking, tired of feeling. Tired of
feeling the anger, confusion and depression… I wanted to do the right thing and
please Allah, mostly to avoid His wrath. But I wasn't clear about that the right
thing was anymore. For the next couple of months I was so depressed I couldn't
eat, and my clothes began to sag.” (pp. 224-225)
On Ramadan, Tate read each of the 114 chapters of the Quran and prayed over her
doubts. Husain (2007) compared his identity to a narrative that was logical and clear one
moment and chaotic and confused the next. His narrative consisted of statements such as
“Our religious tradition and holy book is the truth. Theirs is rotten and corrupt.” (p.110)
and “My God is awesome. Theirs isn’t.” And then came the rupture, where “you
discover things you’d rather not deal with… and it can be painful” (p. 111). Nawaz
(2013) described his experiences as “uncomfortable” and guilt-ridden. “I shied away
from the implications [of my thoughts] for a long time, retreating back into the comfort of
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my Islamic beliefs” (p. 192). Like the other biographers, “as hard as I tried to bury [my
doubts], I couldn't shift the nagging thoughts I had in my mind” (p. 192). Hs wife
divorced him and took the children.
Hirsi’s parents refused to speak to her, her husband left her, and her sister, who
tried to leave too, killed herself, since the loneliness was too intense. Hirsi has
government-paid protection to save her from those who consider her an infidel. Growing
up, she was warned her doubts led to hell, “But I found I couldn't ignore them. I had to
resolve this” (2005, p. 105). Similarly, Held-Evans (2010) persistently:
look[ed] for ways to glue the pieces of my faith back together, trying to convince
myself and my friends that everything was okay. In my commencement address, I
assured the senior class that we were exceptionally prepared to answer life’s
questions, that our biblical worldview glasses would bring everything into focus,
sharpening the contrast between black and white, right and wrong, evil and good.
I said it, wanting desperately to believe it was true. I said it, knowing good and
well that it wasn't going to be that simple. I said it, knowing that the world just
didn’t make that kind of sense anymore.” (p. 80)
Changing long-held convictions can be frightening. Anonymous (2003) reflected
“After reading the Koran, my perspective of reality was jolted. I found myself standing
face-to-face with the truth and I was scared to look at it” (p. 148). Here, by the way, is
another As-Is term. Anonymous (2003) was jolted from the comfort of faith (that told her
she was unique and elite) to incarnational reality: “This wasn't what I was expecting to
see. I had no one to blame, to curse and call a liar. I had found all those absurdities of the
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Koran and the inhumanities of the author by reading the Koran itself.” (p. 148). Nawaz
(2013) titled the chapter of his change “where the heart leads, the mind can follow”, but
he said it took a long time for his mind to change:
My change of views wasn’t an overnight process. Ideological dogma doesn't work
like that: It’s not like a tap you can just switch off. So ingrained was HT’s cause
in my very being that it would be a process of years for me to work my way out of
it. First emotionally and then intellectually, and politically, and finally socially,
until piece by piece I had to reconstruct my personality from the inside out. This
is not an easy thing to do” (p. 181).
His exploration took five agonizing years. “This was the prism, the mind-set from within
which I had viewed the world: to unpick that, in descending order, until I questioned all
my fundamental convictions was nothing less than a paradigm shift” (p. 182).
Once started, the search could not be stopped. This was why Deen (2015) called
his book All Who Go Do Not Return. According to Nasr (2013):
“By September 2006, I was beginning to feel scared from all the blog
reading and blogging, but I couldn't stop. It was too late. My subversive thoughts
and activities had already opened a can of worms that had to be dealt with” (p.
112).
2. What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith
groups?
I extracted one overarching theme of As-Is with three sub-themes of concentrated
multidisciplinary readings of primary texts, critical analysis of religious texts, and
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unexpected altruism by the demonized person. It seemed to me that each of these themes
could be reduced to the As-Is, where face-to-face encounter with an incarnational reality
dispelled indoctrinated intolerance to outsiders.
I noticed that many of the subjects used indicative expressions. Garett (2003), for
instance, said “My mind was a tornado. [After] that moment I felt as though I had been
flying blind for years” (p. 20). Cross (2006) described her studies as a light that broke
through “the fog” (p. 131). Hirsi (2005) said the religious and cultural contradictions
confused her “she couldn't see straight” (p. 32). Later, she added “the “little shutter” in
the back of her brain opened and thoughts came tumbling out (p. 104). Held-Evan (2010)
only knew that “sometime in my late teens or early twenties, it was as if Jesus packed his
bags and moved from my heart into my head” (p. 105). Note the transition from affect to
cognition, where the comfort and emotion of faith gives way to the distance and logic of
cognition.
Research Team
I recruited an assistant to duplicate my research methods and to generate her own
inferences, some of which differed from mine. For example, my assistant noted that one
of the things that made Hill (2013) challenge Scientology was realizing its prescriptions
were based on Society rather than on Religion and that Scientology subordinated
Religion to its own inclinations. Similarly, my assistant thought that one of the things that
made Harris (2011) change was distinguishing between Church and Religion and
noticing that his Church was not necessarily religious in that it transgressed Biblical
prescriptions. Tate (2005), too, contrasted teachings of self-improvement of the Muslim
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Brotherhood with the outside world and concluded her community failed her. When it
came to accounts written by ex-Muslims involved in terrorism or attempted terrorism, my
assistant wrote that “most of these people saw what their religion was doing to other
people and themselves and how what they were taught wasn't true. This made them bitter
and go in different ways... and get angry.”
Deen (2015) contrasted the conduct of people in the outside world where his job
was with that described by his group. Few of these individuals seemed as lecherous,
miserable, and aimless, as his community told him they were. Men and women held
hands when walking the streets. They seemed to live happier and more harmonious lives
than he had been told. Few hated him, as he had been warned. My colleague pointed out
that Watts (2014) also deradicalized himself through repeat encounters with facts. Watts
(2014) wrote that he liked facts. His frustrations with the inaccuracies of his Church
reinforced by extensive reading and a critical review of Holy Writ led him to question his
prejudices.
My assistant came up with five themes: Wide reading, always asking questions,
exposure to the goodness of outsiders, encountering incidents that disproved doctrine.
Her fifth theme was emotional experiences. As mentioned, I rejected that theme for the
reasons described earlier. My assistant pointed to Black (2006) as manifesting each of
these four themes. He conducted wide reading of both core and multidisciplinary texts,
experienced an encounter with as-Is, and described the unexpected loving-kindness of
members of the demonized group. Black (2006), for instance, studied medieval history
and noted that far from Whites being as evolutionarily superior and cultured as he had

77
been taught, they had gone through periods of profound decay during which Muslims and
Asians superseded their intellectual and technological contributions. Black’s discussions
with Jewish hosts on Shabbat made him question his prejudice to the point that he
publicly recanted his opinions. They behaved in ways that contradicted his ideas of them.
Their kindness also bewildered him.
Summary
This chapter described how 21 subjects who grew up in hate-filled closed faith
groups renounced their extreme prejudices, despite being penalized by their groups as a
result. I used IPA and social constructivism to explore for themes and to control my bias
and recruited an objective student to model my research. My study yielded four themes:
As-Is (a phenomenological contact with an unexpected reality that shattered conviction),
intensive reading of the subject’s own religious texts, focused multidisciplinary reading,
and altruistic conduct exhibited by a member of the demonized group. It seemed to me
each of these four themes could be reduced to the As-Is element. Finally, I connected
these themes to my research questions. The As-Is experience seems to have impelled my
subjects to retract their prejudices, while each of my subjects showed common
experiences of isolation from an outside society, living in a violence-saturated society,
and experiencing a progressive unravelling where subjects labored to suppress their
doubts, and were shunned as a result. Chapter Five discusses the limitations and
implications of this study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
This IPA study investigated 21 individuals brought up in closed faith groups who
challenged their extreme prejudice. Certain closed faith groups preach extreme prejudice
resulting in violence, aggression and, sometimes, terrorism. Deradicalization programs
for radicalized individuals exist that employ preventative measures by targeting profiles
of people who are deemed most at risk to violent extremism or developing encountertype groups to encourage tolerance. Some of these programs are effective, but it is
difficult to verify the case-by-case impact and to correctly identify individuals most atrisk, partly because people hide their prejudices (OPM, 2008). The main problem with
such programs is that they attract only individuals who are already interested in meeting
different others, in contrast to members of closed faith groups who fear outsiders would
contaminate them and that they would be penalized by their groups for interacting.
Those, therefore, who most need such programs absent themselves from them.
I wondered how some individuals who grow up in closed faith settings
independently reverse their beliefs and whether there was some insight into their
prejudice reversals that entities like social work practitioners and peace activists could
use. I found their attitude reversal particular confounding given that such individuals
contradict social norms on seeking acceptance and rebel despite being severely penalized
as a result. I also wondered how these individuals were able to detach themselves from
their indoctrinations and change their prejudice attitudes, despite being closed off from
the world.
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Social science researchers largely conduct prejudice interventions on campus
settings in conflict-free environments, rendering results irrelevant to real-life prejudice
(Paluck & Green, 2009). Paluck and Green (2009) also reported that most prejudice
intervention methodologies show minimal to no evidence of efficacy. Finally, prejudice
research tends to investigate moderate to weak prejudice, altogether abandoning bigotry
and extreme intolerance. This study aimed to compensate for those gaps by investigating
autobiographical accounts of radical hostility in real-life settings. I used a flexible IPA to
investigate the lived experiences of 21 former members of closed societies as they
reversed their prejudice attitudes, and to probe for common themes describing the attitude
changes of these individuals. To obtain research objectivity, I recruited an assistant who
replicated my methodology and produced her own results.
I based my research on the following two questions:
RQ1: What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they disengage
and deradicalize?
RQ2: What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith
groups?
This chapter summarizes the study’s findings, before discussing its limitations
and implications for future research.
Connection to the Literature
Paluck and Green’s (200) comprehensive review on prejudice methods concluded
with three recommendations. First, researchers should focus on prejudice in real-life
settings, rather than in the conflict-free environments of academic institutions. Second,
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prejudice studies should integrate qualitative with quantitative research for more reliable
results. Third, more prejudice studies should investigate extreme prejudice, particularly
with bigotry and terrorism on the rise (Paluck, 2012). My study investigated extreme
prejudice in a real-life conflictual setting.
I conducted a flexible IPA to investigate the lived experience of former members
of closed societies as they reversed their indoctrinated bias. An assistant replicated my
study, and we used social constructivism to bracket our bias. My IPA research led to four
themes that seemed to describe the phenomenon under investigation. The first theme I
called “As-Is”, where subjects seemed to experience an unanticipated collision of beliefs
with incarnate reality. The second theme illustrated how subjects reversed their
prejudices through critical reading of their source texts. The third theme dwelt on critical
analysis of multidisciplinary primary texts, while the fourth and last theme showed how
certain subjects renounced their attitudes after receiving, or witnessing, altruism from the
demonized other. It seemed to me that each of the four themes could be reduced to one
“As-Is” essence, where subjects found their beliefs jolted by an unanticipated
phenomenological encounter.
Contrary to more temperate or moderate groups that are less concerned about
members leaving (possibly because they feel more confident with themselves (Sacks,
2017)), closed faith groups are more possessive with their members. They intimidate
them from leaving with threats and abuse and encourage them to stay with promised
rewards (like Paradise) and social incentives like acceptance. Douglas (1966) notes all
societies like to impose order, but that some do so more than others. These groups’
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empathies rituals as meaning-making for identity and societal values and distinguish
between an “us” and a “them” to make its members feel superior (also see Derrida,
1986).
Groups that have more rigid, or doctrinaire, forms of thinking tend to be more
concerned about “infections” invading their orderly world and about the ability of their
immune system to cope with these infections. They, therefore, feel threatened by both
outside and inside influences - by outside influences that are contrary to their own ideas
and by people or ideas that demand parity and move in their own spaces. The last are
ambivalent people within the group, who have been branded as deserters, troublemakers,
or detractors of value (Douglas, 1966). Such people arouse anxiety because they ask
questions that the group is unable to answer or because they are not “like us” (Bauman &
May, 2003).
Most closed groups use a combination of territorial and spiritual separation, such
as insulating themselves into ghettos and making the conditions both “inside” and
“outside” intolerable for detractors if they leave (Douglas, 1966). The more complete the
territorial separation, the more important does the group became because that’s all what
members have. Intercourse with strangers is reduced to strictly business exchanges; social
contacts are avoided (Bauman & May, 2003). Some of the most effective strategies that
the group uses to dissuade intimate connection with these “outsiders” is through overt
hostility, resentment, and prejudice. Active avoidance of contact is constantly boosted by
the fear of contamination from those who are not like “us”. Resentment is associated with
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everything that the stranger represents: their dress, their ways of talking, their rituals,
their food, their lifestyle in all its nuances.
Meanwhile, members of such closed faith groups may often be unaware that they
are controlled, while others crave the order perspective and meaning that their religious
affiliation gives them (Hansberger & Jackson, 2005). People often think they control their
destinies, but as Mead (1934) showed, the “self” is acquired over time through factors
like environment, group, and social interactions with others, rather than an independent
entity. To people who grow up in a closed faith society, their only, or primary,
interactions are largely with those in that community. This shapes their identities and
shapes how they view others.
Recent neuroscientific studies indicate that individuals may be able to overcome
their distorted cognitions when their brains are activated by a logical, analytical
perspective. The psychological term “priming” refers to a stimuli or action that triggers a
particular representation or cognitive association, such as the word “yellow” of a banana.
Chiappe, Smith, and Bessner (1996) found that priming may be inhibited when
participants focus on specific non-evaluative lower-level features of the prime. For
instance, the researchers found that when they broke down the familiar evaluative word
of LOVE into the letter string of L-O-V-E, participants replaced their emotional mindset
with a cognitive one by focusing on those letters. Summarily, Spruyt, De Houwer, and
Hermans (2009) proposed that priming could be modulated by the stimulus information
that it is selectively focused on. Glaser (1992) recommend modulating one’s response to
affective images by intentionally selecting lower-level non-evaluative features (such as
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focusing on the shapes of the images or on individual letters), which would transform the
instinctive evaluative reaction into a logical, analytical stance. I noticed instances where
the prejudice levels of my subjects seemed inhibited when they focused on lower-level
non-evaluative items. Deen (2015), for instance, described how he first began to see his
Rebbe as mortal when he fragmented the myth of the Great Man into phenomenological
particles:
I began to wonder. Where exactly was the Rebbe’s greatness? Was he a scholar?
Was he a saint? Had he ever shown anyone any exceptional kindness? How
would one even know it, considering that he was barely accessible to his
followers, his acts so meticulously scripted, his public utterances limited to
carefully prepared thoughts of little consequence, private audiences always brief
and perfunctory, five minute consultation after a five-hour wait. (p. 15)
Ayduk, Mischel, and Downey (2002) observed that emotional sensitivity seems to
be reduced when the individual focuses on the psychologically distancing, physiological
reactions of the experience, rather than on the emotion itself. People could also distance
themselves by analyzing their physiological reactions during the emotional incident. In
both cases, the individual shifts stimuli from an affective to a non-affective response by
intentionally focusing on lower-level non-evaluative features. In other words, such agents
operate from a fact-based/ As-Is mindset.
Hirsi (2005) described how she saw Kenyan woman molested by Muslim males.
Others from her culture called the women outcasts. Hirsi reduced the spectacle to lowerlevel, cognitive features and saw them as thirsty women who needed help. On the
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response, she differed between the people and the religion: “Everyone in that camp called
themselves Muslims and yet nobody helped these women in the name of Allah. Everyone
was praying - but no one showed compassion” (Infidel, 2007, p. 158).
Neurological research shows that when a person fixates on emotional aspects, the
cerebral emotionally-involved regions of the amygdala are flooded with cerebral brain
fluid (CBF). This CBF decreases when the person fixates on attentionally-demanding,
cognitive tasks, reducing the viewer’s emotional response (Drevets & Raichle, 1998).
The left prefrontal cortex, which is the analytical sector, is now activated with its own
fluid (Drevets & Raichle, 1998) and the person can act rationally. Applying Drevets and
Raichle (1998) to my study, I noticed the affect-based prejudices of my subjects seemed
to vanish when their minds focused on cognitive-based facts, regardless of the context. I
called this the As-Is factor. Held-Evans (2010), for instance, quotes one Mormon
missionary friend who reflected: “I’ve gotten to know some Muslims pretty well...and
that’s really changed my perspective. They're not all violent fundamentalists. They don't
all hate America” (p. 85). This was the logical thinking of the left cortex at play rather
than the emotion of the amygdala. The missionary particularized Muslims into
individuals, no longer as a generic demonized entity.
None of these individuals whom I studied chose to challenge their prejudices.
None wanted to - just as none of these individuals would have chosen to attend an
interfaith or deradicalization event. Certain non-evaluative, cognitive-based experiences
unexpectedly occurred and all found their convictions altered. Husain (2007) was told all
professors hated Islam, but his university professors “hardly conformed to that
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stereotype” (p. 158). Anonymous (2003) described himself as “the typical religious
fundamentalist, trapped in my own world of conspiracies; the Jews are behind
everything” (p. 15). His prejudices changed when he read the Koran in English: “When I
read it for the first time, I became very worried by the amount of violence in the texts.
Subsequent late night sessions with the Koran convinced me that I was reading a text to
war” (p. 127).
Finally, Harris (2011) described his attitude change when he saw a minister of a
vilified church feed homeless individuals from his own resources. To Harris, this was
real Christian love in contrast to the kind practiced by his own group who carried
placards and denounced homosexuals. Says he “I knew it [i.e., love] when I saw it.” (p.
20). One sees the cognitive component that came with lower-level elements (where the
practices of his group were reduced to standing with placards and yelling). This defeated
the literal brain-washing (or swamping) of emotional faith.
Anonymous (2003) described how her Quranic analysis (where her mind was
absorbed in non-evaluative elements) brought her “face-to-face with the truth” (p. 148).
Note that “truth” is a cognitive term. She reflected that “The denial [of faith] acts as a
shield that covers [believers], that protects them and that saves them from facing the pain
of shock and disillusionment” (p. 148). This is supported by Drevets and Raichle (1998)
who note that when a person fixates on emotional aspects, the cerebral emotionallyinvolved regions are flooded with cerebral brain fluid (CBF), which stops them from
thinking rationally and seeing the As-Is in its incarnate form. What believers need,
Anonymous (2003) reflected, “is a good shock” to jolt them from their emotional comfort
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zone. Muslims, she says, need to be “bombarded with facts” (p. 149). Drevets and
Raichle (1998) demonstrate that concentrating on non-evaluative elements reduces the
CBF fluid in the emotionally-involved regions. What actually happens is that the mind
converts its emotional triggers into cognitive assessments.
Hariri, Bookheimer, and Mazziota (2000) used MRI to show that when
participants focused on emotional expressions of facial images, the CBF of these
participants increased in the left and right amygdala. On the other hand, when these
images were accompanied with linguistic labels (which represents a cognitive task), their
CBF decreased in the amygdala region and increased in the right prefrontal cortex,
associated with emotion. The researchers concluded that the analytical functions of
interpretation and labeling can inhibit emotional responses at the most fundamental levels
in the brain. Evans and Treisman (2005) also note that context has a major influence on
the responses people make. The more the context emphasizes a cognitive type of
perception, the more rational is the response and the more it reduces the emotional
percept of the target.
In short, extreme prejudice is tantamount to Simon’s (1982) bounded rationality,
where emotions hinder their possessors from seeing reality as is. Prejudiced individuals
literally “brainwashed” by their emotional faith convictions, have their right prefrontal
cortex flooded with cerebral fluid that impedes them from considering anything that
contradicts their beliefs. It is only when a jarring encounter causes the mind to shift into a
cognitive mode, that CBF decreases in the amygdala-emotion filled region and allows the
left region (of logic) to dominate. Indeed, Anonymous (2003) suggested that the one way
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to challenge Muslim believers is by subtly feeding them data that contradicts their
convictions. Nothing else, no encounter groups, deradicalization programs, prejudice
intervention strategies, or the like, have the same effect.
While there is some literature on the disaffiliation process from religious groups, I
think there is a radical difference between disaffiliation from “simple” religions and
disaffiliation from a fundamentalist or extremist religious background with strong
pressure to conform and isolation from an outside world. Fisher (2017), for instance,
reviews multidisciplinary research on changes related to exiting religion and the process
that an individual transitioning toward irreligion may experience. Fisher’s (2017) review
plots a seven-step process of questioning, doubt, reconfiguration of faith, switching,
changes to irreligious identities or “deconversion,” disaffiliation, and opposition to
previously held religious beliefs. According to Fisher (2017), all individuals set out by
experiencing unconscious questioning that sharpens into doubt. Individuals often choose
to switch to a different religious group within their wider group or may reconfigure by
“flying under the radar” (e.g. Berger, 2015, p.679). All this time, they may reject the
proxy but retain the theology. A certain undocumented percentage of Ultra-Orthodox
Jews who are too intimidated to outright leave their communities live secret lives as
agnostic or atheist individuals while publicly appearing Orthodox (e.g., Berger, 2015).
For some, such behavior results in higher levels of psychological distress as well as in
more marital tension (Fisher, 2017). Deconversion is the next step, where the member
leaves the religious group. This may be followed by disaffiliation which takes two forms,
ending one’s membership or “dropping out” of activity in the religion (Fisher, 2017) and
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misidentification with the group or theology (Fisher, 2017). In a study of conversion
narratives of former Muslims, Khalil and Balici (2017) found that most former Muslims
became Christian, agnostics and atheists. Apparently, more males than women
deconverted, although Khalil and Balici’s (2017) study is based only on a limited sample
of popular published narratives, popular online testimonials and interviews with former
Muslims.
As Fisher (2017) notes, the process and after-effects of deconversion vary from
person to person. Some exit the group quickly (sometimes within a few weeks), while
others take years of uncertainty and anguish to make the break. Defectors leave for a
variety of reasons, ranging from intellectual concerns to psychological motives. Their
reason for leaving tend to depend on their own personal experiences and on the practices
and aspects of their groups (Fisher, 2016). Shaffir and Rockaway (1987), for instance,
found that ultra-orthodox Jews who disaffiliated were motivated by extended periods of
doubt, or having questions ignored or poorly dealt with by others. Khalil and Balici
(2007) report that former Muslims cite the status of women as a major motivating factor
for their exits. Hookway and Habibis (2015) conclude that individuals from Jehovah
Witness seem to leave largely because of their dissatisfaction with JW practices together
with the allure of freedom and the hedonistic attractions of this-worldly lifestyles.
Similarly, the after-effects vary according to the rigidity of their groups. Goren and Plaut
(2012) concluded that not only do some deconverts not experience emotional pain as a
part of the process, but they also benefit from non-belief in some ways, such us such as
higher prosociality toward outgroup members. It seems to me that Goren and Plaut’s
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(2012) studies come from more moderate religious groups, where leaving is not treated so
weightily or harshly as it is in more extremist versions.
Defectors from most extreme groups suffer more intensely and longer than
defectors from more moderate groups, where most still keep in touch with their friends,
have not experienced the type or intensity of indoctrination that those from extremist
groups experience, are better able to transition to an “outside” world and are, generally,
not punished for doing so. In most cases, defectors tend to feel guilt, anxiety, the
confusion and pain of switching from a life-narrative that made sense and that ordered
their identities and gave them a mission to a world that was suddenly purposeless.
Hookway and Habibis (2015), for instance, found that individuals who defected from JW
experienced high levels of anxiety, guilt, and insecurity. (“The gamble on freedom had
immediate rewards but they continued to fear its ultimately catastrophic consequences –
‘getting wiped out’ at Armageddon” (Hookway & Habibis, 2015, p. 854). This is
particularly the case with those individuals across groups who transitioned to agnosticism
or atheism. Indeed, Moscati and Mezuk (2014) found that such transition in perceptors
tended to demote self-esteem and, occasionally, resulted in substance abuse. Scheitle and
Adamczyk (2010) associate defection from “strict” religion with worse health. In
Berger’s (2015) treatise on former ultra-orthodox Jews, he reports that finding show the
same “taxing personal process [of culture shock, loneliness, and financial difficulties” (p.
680) as reported in studies of those defecting from the Mormon Church (Albrecht and
Bahr, 1983), cults (Solomon, 1991), the Amish (Garrett and Farrant, 2003) or Islam
(Khalil and Bilici, 2007). Berger (2015) describes that:
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Like immigrants thrown into a strange land where they do not know the rules, the
language, what is expected and what is prohibited, without a script to guide them
or anybody to support them, exiters felt like aliens and tried to grope their way to
the best of their ability. These challenges yielded feelings of anxiety, frustration,
loneliness, sadness, anger, and distress as manifested in statements such as ‘‘it
drove me crazy’’ and ‘‘I was dying inside.’’ (pp. 680-681)
Many individuals feel stuck between two worlds, unable to feel accepted or comfortable
in mainstream society (e.g., Fisher, 2017).
Fisher’s (2017) final step of the exit process is apostasy where a certain segment
of defectors not only disaffiliate but also indicate an oppositional stance where they
“engage in a continuous chain of acts of revenge against [her or his] own spiritual past”
(Scheler, 1992, p. 131). Fisher (2017) cited Smith (2011) who found that those who came
from stricter religious backgrounds tended to more resentment toward religion and were
more public about these feelings than others. In a study of former evangelical Christians,
Fazzino (2014) noted that publicizing the negative aspects of their religion helped these
individuals make more sense of their disaffiliation. Most famous former Muslims in this
category include writers and activists like Muslim-turned-Christian Nonie Darwish,
Jeffrey Lang (Losing My Religion: A Call for Help), and Muslim-turned-agnostic Ibn
Warraq (Why I am not a Muslim and Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out). Some of these
works were quoted in this essay.
In my brief review on the disaffiliation process from religious groups, I noticed
that several authors (e.g., Albrecht and Bahr (1990) on those exiting the Mormon Church

91
and Greil and Davidman (2007) on the defection of Orthodox Jews) noted that the more
religious the upbringing, the less likely was the person to leave. This was not the case
with me - I came from an intensely religious background - nor was it the case with my 21
subjects. Some researchers also suggest that disaffiliation from strict groups is prompted
by dysfunction in filial attachment and cross-generational religious adherence (e.g.,
Hookway & Habibis, 2015). Greil and Davidman (2007), for instance, found that
movement out of the Haredim was often prompted by the presence of a less committed
parent. Again, I found exceptions with my subjects. Most of my case studies (although
not myself) had close contact with their parents, if not grandparents. There was no intergenerational break.
In the end, I can only conclude that people leave their religious groups for a
variety of reasons that vary according to their particular experiences, characters, and
qualities of their groups, strictness of their groups, economic, political, and geo-historical
aspects, among other factors. Reasons are so diverse that it may impossible to generalize.
Interpretations of the Findings
I chose to study extreme prejudice because of the lack of research on this
important topic (Paluck & Green, 2009). Since Paluck and Green (2009) recommend that
prejudice researchers focus on real life situations in conflict-filled settings, I studied
individuals who grew up in closed faith societies and who independently retracted their
prejudices. I chose this population after realizing that prejudice-reduction programs, like
deradicalization programs or programs based on Allport’s (1954) ‘contact hypothesis’
idea, have small to minimal impact on extreme prejudice. (Allport’s contact hypothesis
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recommends acquaintanceship with members of the stigmatized group and has evolved
into egalitarian, interfaith groups, and the like. According to Paluck and Green (2009),
the contact hypothesis works best under limited and largely superficial/ laboratory
conditions).
On the one hand, governments focus on reactive measures such as
deradicalization groups in response to individuals who are already radicalized. On the
other hand, social scientists develop preventative measures, seeking to remediate the
psychological, emotional and intellectual appeal of social narratives that violence-based
groups use to recruit their members. Examples of the latter include programs that teach
perspective-taking (Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky & Moscowitz, 2000), awareness of
moral hypocrisy (Oskamp, 1992; Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002), and training in complex
thinking and in statistical logic (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Such programs are usually
executed in school or college classrooms and may challenge a group’s ideology by
pointing out contradictions in its theology (e.g., Christmann, 2012), involving members
in positive affiliative-building activities, or giving them responsibilities to provide the
feeling of belonging and sense of purpose that people attracted to terrorist groups cherish
(Christmann, 2012; Davies, 2016).
The Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS) (2015) pointed out
differences in extreme prejudice across three types of groups - terrorist organizations,
gangs, and cults - and recommended that deradicalization programs would improve their
efficacy if they focused on the disjuncture between these different groups. Terrorist
affiliation is usually produced by a sense of political grievance or individual
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victimization, fear of threat, or the member seeking a sense of community or “belonging”
(e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Gang affiliation is usually produced by
economics, poor education, dysfunctional family, and a longing for gang, or
“brotherhood”, participation (e.g., Brotherton & Barrios, 2004; Jones, Roper, Stys, &
Wilson, 2004). Religious, utopian, or psychotherapeutic cults (typified by the closed faith
societies of my study), present a brotherhood, or affiliative, motivation, too, but members
are also motivated by ideological factors, by a sense of eliteness, and by the cognitive
dissonance engendered by the abandonment of such beliefs. The evaluative, or
psychological, motivators are so intense that the member’s identity becomes absorbed
into the powerful collective identity of the group (Huddy, 2001), members are unable to
think independently of the group, and this identity becomes a core aspect of the
indoctrination process (Ferguson et al., 2016). (It’s about the group, I once heard
someone say, not about God). Years of this type of indoctrination cause psychiatrists like
Winell to note that:
The most difficult thing to overcome, by far, is overcoming the intense
indoctrination of early years. As an adult, for example, the fear of hell can pop up
and cause panic attacks even if a person rationally rejects the doctrine.
(“JourneyFree”; online)
In contrast to the prejudice of terrorist or gang affiliation, when it comes to cult-induced
prejudice, none of the standard prejudice-reducing interventions have the slightest
impact. Cult members function, as it were, on the lowest levels of Abraham Maslow’s
(1943) hierarchy of needs theory, where they know that were they to question their
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indoctrination or associate with outsiders, they would suffer great loss, which includes
their sense of purpose (Gallant, 2016) and group-sourced identities (Ellemers, Spears, &
Doosje, 2002).
Oskamp (1992) recommends exposure to atypical exemplars to inhibit prejudice.
There is also the popular theory of combating prejudice by exposing the prejudiced
individual to different cultures and other examples of thought, through channels like the
internet, social media, courses on anthropology or comparative religions, travel, or films
(e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009). The problem with suggestions such as these is that cult
members, that include isolated faith groups, are sequestered from the outside world and
indoctrinated to reject these influences. Leaving my-conformism aside (where people
naturally tend to gravitate to views that confirm their own), encounter models are
irrelevant to cult members, since members of radically insulated groups have little to no
contact with the world and are bred to fear them.
In short, it seemed to me that whichever way I turned, I came up against the
logical fallacy of circulus in probando, or circular reasoning. I wanted to find a solution
for extreme prejudice, but a significant population of those who manifest extreme
prejudice grow up in environments that are closed to reforming impressions nor are they
amenable to reflecting, nor can outsiders approach them. There are plenty of programs
that exist for prejudice, but as Paluck and Green (2009) pointed out most of these
programs are for weak to moderate prejudice, and the few programs that exist for extreme
prejudice attract those who self-select or who are forced to attend.
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My own research pointed me to the As-Is theme where individuals growing up in
indoctrinated backgrounds seemed to reject their prejudices once they unexpectedly
encountered a core left-cortical phenomena that collided with their emotional
convictions. The As-Is came either from an encounter with a core text (a primary source
as is in its incarnate form), or from seeing events or a situation in its lowest-level form. In
all cases, the impetus came from the perceptor, rather than from someone trying to
convince the prejudiced individual with a program or with reasoning. It was some
cognitive fact from an experience, from something they read, from an act of kindness
done to them that caused them to change their minds. For instance, Deen (2015) found
that contrary to what he had been taught, Jews, outside his group, knew more about
Judaism than he. When he communicated with outsiders, “I soon discovered a world of
people entirely different from anyone I knew” (p. 128). Early experiences of this As-Is
factor were “infuriating” to him. They “shattered the narrative he had been given” (p.
128).
An As-Is experience from critical reading was descried by one of Ibn Warraq’s
(2003) subjects, when the person reads the Koran in English for the first time. The author
described himself as “the typical religious fundamentalist, trapped in my own world of
conspiracies; the Jews are behind everything” (p. 15). Reading the Koran in English (in
order to correspond with an online group) was where things changed.
“Prior to joining this organization, I hadn't read the Koran in English, instead
reading it in Arabic (believing this would bring me Swaab - blessings). When I
read it for the first time, I became very worried by the amount of violence in the
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texts. Subsequent late night sessions with the Koran convinced me that I was
reading a text to war.” (p. 127).
The person saw the text in its essence, in contrast to the enculturated meaning
imposed on it by his society.
Cross (2006) was affected by critical multidisciplinary reading where she
concentrated on source texts. Intensive historical research showed her there were
hundreds of books purporting to be the exclusive testimonies of Jesus and that it was only
because of the subjective section of the Council of Nicaea that 66 books were called Holy
Scripture. Cross (2006) writes:
I closed my history book and stared out in the blank openness of the universe. If,
instead of God’s direct revelation from heaven, the Bible was simply a
compilation of religious writings that supported an emerging third-century
religious sect, fundamentalist Christianity was a house of cards. Its cornerstone
belief that the Bible was without error and thus could be used as a textbook for
modern ethics was patently absurd. (p. 133).
Finally, there is the As-Is altruism of the demonized other, described, for instance,
by Harris (2011) with the impression of the minister who quietly fed homeless
individuals from his own resources. The unexpected experience, or face-to-face
encounter with pure goodness, shook his fidelity to his Church. Love doesn't happen, he
wrote, by being isolated from the world, but by interacting with the world and engaging
in practical, literal love. Almost all of the subjects described a long, drawn-out and
tormented struggle, where it was only the desire to know the truth that pushed them on.
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The experience of change must be felt by the subject. When Deen (2015), for instance,
tried to share his experiences with his wife, he was unable to reach her. Similarly,
Anonymous (2003) insisted it was futile to debate a terrorist’s beliefs. Not everyone is
willing to change, nor can the impact of this change experience be transmitted to another.
Recommendations
Certain outsiders who penetrate the defenses of isolated close faith societies
include doctors, social workers, certain specialized teachers, and other professionals.
These practitioners may serve as channel to reduce harmful prejudices through their
regular interactions with the group, by subtly exposing group members to ideas and
influences that contradict negative perceptions of the other.
As Anonymous (2003) insisted, we have to bombard strong believers with “facts”
to overcome “the hurdle of tradition and false values imposed on us by thousands of
years of religious upbringing… The word faith means belief without evidence” (p. 149).
Strong believers need evidence. At these same time, because strong believers are in
denial, this evidence needs to be subtle and “bombarded” - directed at them without it
appearing manipulated by an agent: “The denial acts as a shield that covers them, that
protects them, that saves them from facing the pain of shock and disillusionment. Once
that shield is up nothing can bring it down (p. 148).”
Messages also need to be customized:
Because every person's sensitivity is different, what shocks one person may not
shock another? Even as a man, I was shocked when I read that Muhammad
instructed his followers to beat their wives. Yet I have come to know many
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Muslim women who have no difficulty accepting these derogatory statements
uttered by their prophet [because] they are in denial. (p. 148)
Bertram (2016) noted that “factors that contribute to the radicalization of a
terrorist may include religious discourse [and] deceptive teachings” (p. 124) and to
counteract these deceptive teachings, workers should provide “counter-narrative[s] that
identify the conflict between [the religion] and the distortion of [that religion] that was
propagated by the terrorist organization” (p. 124). My study suggested these counternarratives should be fact-based and introduced as ingenuously as possible as though it
were the believer randomly encountering them for himself, rather than an outsider
pushing them on him. Invited outsiders should work from the strong believer’s
perspective. Cult members exist in a paradigm outside of the secular world, therefore
common motives like a good job, career, a college education, or money tend to not appeal
to them.
Change, too, starts with the influencer modeling qualities that contradicts the way
they’ve been demonized. This means not only acting ethically and professionally, but
also demonstrating deep, unconditional care to the other and appearing informed about
the other’s culture while being broad-minded, well-read and knowledgeable on matters in
general. Brown (2016), former KKK leader, was influenced by the Shabbat meal and
background discussions of his Jewish college friends that were unexpectedly more logical
and open-minded than anticipated.
In short, outsiders who work in faith-based societies that practice extreme
prejudice can contribute to preventative deradicalization through their communications
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with members of these groups. Practitioners should challenge toxic views with a subtle,
purely fact-based reasoning and approach the prejudice teachings from different angles,
since people tend to respond differently to different aspects. These agents should be
consistent, they should not attack the culture of the targeted member, and their
mannerisms and involvement should indicate an outside world where people act and
think contrary to stereotypes. Their attitudes, interactions, and conduct should be
sympathetic, refined, and exemplary. Such invited outsiders include therapists
(occupational, physical and psychological), certain teachers, school secretaries and the
like.
Although people are generally reluctant to interfere with another culture on the
basis of cultural tolerance popular in the West, invited outsiders can be brought to
recognize that their actions may not necessarily violate political correctness. Their
motives are to target the harm-inducing prejudice opinions, nothing else, and they do so
by appealing to recognizable facts. Unchallenged deceptive teachings could lead to
disasters like suicide, homicide, conflict, violence, and terrorism. Invited outsiders could
be told they are only professionals with access to such an unreachable group.
Governments, or pace-organizations, can sponsor training programs for such
invited outsiders as part of their professional training. So a law informant worker, social
worker or therapist, for instance, could receive a course, as part of their training, on how
to mitigate prejudice in a cult-like setting. Relevant programs could exist outside
specialized training, too, and material (such as books, brochures, lectures) could be
produced on the matter.
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Limitations of the Study
Yin (1994) points out that researchers who analyze documents or content tend to
possess a “biased selectivity,” where the researcher may consciously or otherwise select
documents that support his viewpoint and reflect her beliefs. Furthermore, a
documentary IPA has limitations which include the researcher’s bias, that their
assumptions cannot be corroborated by subjects and that some of these autobiographical
narratives may contradict other autobiographical narratives of the same genre.
Additionally, a larger subject sample may have given me different, if not contradictory,
results. Autobiography also lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which makes my study
questionable from the start. Moreover, my study tested a prejudice typology produced by
socialization, while extreme prejudice also comes from trauma (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001),
which may render the implications of this study irrelevant to other populations. Finally,
some studies (e.g., Farrell et al, 2013) suggest that cognitive-based attitudes are most
effectively challenged with logic arguments, while affect-based attitudes need affectbased reasoning. Since prejudice is affect-based, it may be that certain people can only be
reached by an affect-based, rather than a fact-based response, and, contrary to my
suggestions, would be resilient to fact-based reasoning.
Implications of the Study
If my recommendations succeed, they would likely do so only on a receptive
personality. Deen (2015), for instance, was driven by his intellectual need for truth and
disaffiliated himself from his group. His wife, Gitty, on the other hand was far more
emotionally-driven. She persisted with her emotional retention to faith (“Our Rebbe,” she
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insisted, “was not to be questioned. I was taught to have faith in the righteous.” (Deen,
2015, p. 16). Hirsi (2007), too, noted she seemed to be the only one with doubts. Her
friends accepted their social norms and culture. All they wanted to do was get married,
settle down, retain their society’s approval, and remain part of their communities. In
contrast, Hirsi needed her belief system to be logical and consistent. Some individuals are
resilient to logic-based arguments and may only be susceptible, if at all, to affect-based
experiences (Farrell et al, 2013). As Gielen (2017) argued: we need to move away from
the “what works?” question towards the “what works, for whom, in what circumstances,
and how?”
Given these limitations, it seems to me that if my insights impacted even one
percent of my targeted population, my study would be valuable in that it would
exponentially affect that particular segment, with at least one individual desisting from
tram sitting his, or her, legacy of extreme prejudice.
Conclusion
My study used an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) on 21 individuals
to investigate how certain individuals who were brought up in closed faith societies
voluntarily altered their extreme prejudice to outsiders. The research indicated that
prejudice reversal manifested four themes: The overarching As-Is; analytical reading of
group texts; critical broad/ multidisciplinary reading; and love or altruism, where an
outsider’s goodness or kindness defied stereotype. The study suggested that governments
could use this research to sponsor prejudice-reducing programs and material that draw on
these themes for invited outsiders who work in a cult or in a closed faith group setting.
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The invited outsider’s communication style should incorporate a subtle, purely fact-based
reasoning and approach deceptive teachings from different angles. These professionals
should be consistent, they should not attack the culture of the targeted member, and their
conduct and involvement with the member should contradict how the group has
stereotyped these outsiders. My study and recommendations have limitations, but it
seems to me that if my insights impacted even one percent of my targeted population, the
exponential effect may make the world more peaceful.
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